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Abstract
This paper aims to provide a comprehensive background and overview of key issues, 
debates and positions related to the international regulation and application of intellectual 
property rights over biological resources, including biotechnology, and the use and pro-
tection of the traditional knowledge of indigenous and local communities. It explores the 
linkages among biological diversity, rural livelihoods, biotechnology developments and 
intellectual property with speciﬁc view on the relationship between access to biological 
and genetic resources, agriculture systems, food security, and increased poverty levels 
around the world. 
The paper starts by outlining the background and evolution of intellectual property rights. 
It then provides two case studies on how intellectual property rights affect biodiver-
sity and traditional knowledge. In the main part, the paper indulges on the international 
governance of biodiversity and intellecutal property rights, especially focussing on the 
Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD), the World Intellecutal Property Organization 
(WIPO), and the World Trade Organization with its Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellecutal Property Rights (TRIPS). However it also sheds light on the increasing 
impacts of bilateral agreements that govern intellectual property rights in conjunction 
with the plurilateral International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV), and it analyses their relationship with the FAO International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture and the CBD. The paper ﬁnishes by sketch-
ing out ideas for a way forward. 
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1.  Introduction: Setting the scene
This paper* aims to provide a comprehensive background and overview of key issues, 
debates and positions related to the international regulation and application of intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) over biological resources, including biotechnology, and the use and 
protection of the traditional knowledge of indigenous and local communities. The link-
ages among biological diversity, rural livelihoods, biotechnology developments and intel-
lectual property have been increasingly explored and analysed in recent years. The appli-
cation of IPRs to plant varieties and the role of biotechnology have particularly important 
implications given the relationship between access to biological and genetic resources, 
agriculture systems, food security, and increased poverty levels around the world.
There is a growing interest on the potential commercial uses of biodiversity, which is 
driving many of the policy and legislative developments in this area, such as the sharing 
of benefi ts, the role of traditional knowledge-holders, and the role and responsibilities of 
countries that provide and use these resources and knowledge. A 1999 study provided 
estimates of the size of global markets for uses of genetic resources in the pharmaceuti-
cal, seed, cosmetic, horticultural and botanical medicine industries, with fi gures ranging 
from US$20 billion a year in the horticultural sector, to US$300 billion a year in the case 
of pharmaceuticals1. The commercial seed market has been estimated at US$30 billion a 
year and is fast growing due to increasing food demands2. However, it should be added 
that the non-commercial cultural and spiritual values of biodiversity for rural and indig-
enous communities all over the world are more diffi cult to calculate in monetary terms 
but also more important for them and their own survival3.
Since the early 1990s, an interesting parallel process has taken place: on the one hand, 
international law and policy have shifted from considering biological genetic resources 
as common heritage of humankind — and therefore free for all — to giving States sover-
eignty and control over these resources. In addition, this situation has been further affected 
by the increased promotion of private ownership and the use of IPRs over plant and crop 
varieties. Another factor to be considered is that most developing countries did not have 
IPR regulations before they joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995 and so 
they are tackling the implementation of the WTO Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) while they are also addressing the appli-
cation of other relevant regimes such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
and the FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture.
* The author would like to thank Shikha Bhakoo for her research assistance in the preparation of this 
paper.
1 ten Kate K and Laird S, The commercial use of biodiversity, 1999, Earthscan, London. 
2 Dutfi eld G, Intellectual Property Rights, Trade and Biodiversity, 2000, Earthscan, London
3 Id.
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Together with the ongoing emphasis on genetic resources and the use of biotechnol-
ogy to develop new varieties and products, there is growing international interest on 
the potential applications of the knowledge and know-how that indigenous peoples and 
rural communities have developed and applied to natural resources over generations. 
Concerns have been raised as to the ways in which  traditional  knowledge, innovations 
and practices are being accessed and used by non-indigenous individuals and by public 
and private researchers and companies in both industrialised and developing countries. 
 Different ways and options to regulate access to genetic resources, the potential uses 
of such genetic material, and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefi ts that may be 
derived from genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge, are being explored 
by a number of international organisations in multiple fora. In this context, positions are 
shifting as countries further their understanding of possible policy and regulatory options 
and mechanisms to protect the rights of traditional knowledge-holders at the national and 
international level, as well as the implications of those options on other policy areas, such 
as research, trade or agriculture. 
Two major groups of  civil society  are closely linked to the shaping of national positions 
and policy, as well as public opinion, on these issues, although with a different degree 
of  infl uence : (i) industry and the private sector, and (ii) grass-roots organisations, and 
environmental and development Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). They oper-
ate at different levels and in very different ways, as the motivation is clearly distinct. 
While industry s lobbying takes place mostly in closed circles, NGOs campaign on these 
issues through the use of the media in informing the general public to raise public aware-
ness of these highly complex  new  issues: biotechnology, intellectual property rights, 
bioprospecting, trade, and their impact on the environment and rural livelihoods. NGOs 
portray through the media specifi c experiences and examples of the shortcomings of the 
current international legal and policy framework such as patents granted in the US over 
the neem tree, basmati rice, and the Andean root crop  maca . 
At the heart of these issues lies the complexity of the international system governing bio-
diversity, access to genetic resources, the protection of traditional knowledge and the use 
of intellectual property rights. The web of international treaties and regional conventions 
governing biodiversity and IPRs, and the increasing number of bilateral trade agreements 
between industrialised nations and developing countries requiring the latter to accept 
stricter IPR standards than they are obliged to under global rules, are all contributing 
to a rapidly changing and highly uncertain policy environment, which is affecting the 
world s rapidly dwindling biological diversity. This situation is not helped by the fact that 
a number of international agencies and institutions overlap on these issues and are pur-
suing different agendas and priorities with varying levels of co-ordination with the rest. 
Lack of agreement among the countries member of such agencies on which institution 
should take the lead on which issue also marks the current state of affairs, which is result-
ing in a slow pace of progress towards fi nding the solutions that are urgently needed.
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The extent to which developing countries can infl uence the outcomes of the international 
IPR debate has been analysed by a number of academics and activists, with the overall 
conclusion that they have  comparatively little infl uence 4. The main reason for this lack 
of infl uence over the years, which can be tested on the outcomes of international debates 
on IPR issues, has been found to lie  on the continued use of webs of coercion by the US 
and EU, both of which remain united on the need for strong global standards of intel-
lectual property 5. The same author evaluated the TRIPS negotiations in accordance with 
a theory of  democratic property rights , arguing that effi cient property rights are more 
likely to emerge if three conditions are met6: (i) all relevant interests have to be repre-
sented in the negotiating process (the condition of representation); (ii) all those involved 
in the negotiation must have full information about the consequences of various possi-
ble outcomes (the condition of full information); and (iii) one party must not coerce the 
others (the condition of non-domination). Drahos concluded that the negotiations of the 
TRIPS Agreement did not meet these conditions of democratic bargaining.
A central question is whether the international acceptance and expansion of common 
standards of patent protection through international treaties, which were developed to 
meet the conditions and needs of advanced industrialised countries, may have the effect of 
undermining biodiversity, traditional knowledge-systems, and the food security of com-
munities in developing countries. Globalisation has emphasised the linkages and con-
fl icts between international trade rules, domestic priorities, standards of IPR protection, 
and resource needs, which are resulting in a fast expanding gap between industrialised 
and developing countries, as well as in growing differences and inequalities within those 
countries. As stated in its title, this paper aims to provide an overview of those  key issues 
and current debates  regarding the nature of and linkages between IPRs and biodiversity, 
with the objective of shedding some light over the impact of policy developments and 
country positions on the future life of the planet.
4 Drahos P, Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-setting, Study Paper 
8, 2002, commissioned by the UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights.
5 Id.
6 Id.
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2.  The evolution of intellectual property rights 
2.1  Background
Patents and other intellectual property rights (IPRs) are awarded to individuals or organi-
sations mainly for inventions and creative works, giving the creator/inventor the incentive 
of a right to prevent others from unauthorised use for a limited period of usually 20 years. 
The basis of IPRs is to provide incentives to promote and reward technical and techno-
logical innovation and artistic developments. Patent owners receive exclusive rights for a 
fi xed period of time during which they control the commercial use of their invention. 
Patent protection has its origins in industrialised countries, and more specifi cally in 
Europe, where early types of patents can be traced back to the 14th century. However, 
patents were regulated in the late 18th century and during the 19th century in the US 
and some European countries with the objective of encouraging the import and local 
adaptation of technologies that had been developed and tested elsewhere. Many Euro-
pean countries formalised and enforced IPRs gradually, as they shifted from being net 
users to net producers of intellectual property, with countries such as France, Germany 
and Switzerland only completing what is now considered standard IPR protection in the 
1960s and 1970s. It is worth recalling that before the adoption of the Paris Convention for 
the Protection of Industrial Property in 1883, countries had had total discretion to adopt 
national IPR regimes in line with their own circumstances and needs. In addition, the 
1883 Paris Convention allowed countries to exclude areas of technology from patenting 
and to determine the duration of patents themselves. This level of fl exibility which was 
used by industrialised countries to expand and strengthen their industrial competitive-
ness, as they were  developing , is currently being denied to developing countries. 
The implications of this evolution are two-fold: (i) tight and uniform IPRs were not 
the only way technologies were transferred between industrial countries, and (ii) each 
country developed its own way of introducing IPRs at its own pace, which highlights 
the importance for developing countries to create their own IPR strategies, even within 
the multilateral regime7. Not surprisingly, those countries that fi rst developed IPRs, and 
which strengthened their regimes as their industries needed to protect their investments, 
were instrumental in placing IPRs at the core of the international trade agenda. This was 
achieved by promoting a specifi c agreement to ensure minimum IPR standards as part of 
the  package deal  that countries had to accept to become members of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) in the mid-1990s. 
7 UNDP, 2001 Human Development Report, Chapter 5. 
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The 2001 Human Development Report8 reminds us that Article 27 of the 1948 Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights recognises everyone s right „to the protection of the 
moral and material interests resulting from any scientifi c, literary or artistic production“ 
of which they are the author, as well as „the right to share in scientifi c advancement 
and its benefi ts“. The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS Agreement) also calls for a balance between the promotion of technologi-
cal innovation and the transfer and dissemination of technology (emphasis added). The 
UNDP report exposes two problems with the global IPR regime which represent major 
obstacles for progress in human development. One of them is that IPRs can go too far 
and hamper innovation, rather than encourage it, and unfairly distribute the ownership 
of knowledge. The second one signals problems to achieve a fair implementation of the 
TRIPS Agreement. The UNDP report considers that these two trends „hamper innovation 
and shift traditional knowledge into private hands“. 
The confl ict and controversy that surrounded the negotiations of the TRIPS Agreement 
have continued regarding its implementation and review in recent years. International 
discussions on the “correct” or most appropriate international system of IPRs, and the 
merits of global harmonisation, have been largely related to the desirability of achieving 
such uniformity at a strong and strict, rather than fl exible, standard of IPR enforcement9. 
Harmonised standards result in the need to align domestic and international laws, the 
latter having been based to a very large extent on the domestic legal frameworks of one 
or several similar countries. International rules on IPRs create the obligation to adopt 
legal concepts and frameworks based on western cultures and values. International rules, 
shaped closely in accordance with the needs of industrialised nations to protect the inter-
ests and investments of their industries, are forced on societies with different priorities 
and needs, in the name of globalisation. 
Since 1980, when the US was the fi rst country to accept a patent on a living organism10 (and 
more specifi cally: a genetically modifi ed micro-organism)11, such patents have increased 
in industrialised countries. That patent granted in 1980 started a growing trend to issue 
patents not only for inventions for also for discoveries of information already existing in 
the natural world, as it has been the case of the genetic sequencing of living organisms12. 
One of the main consequences of these developments has been the commoditisation and 
privatisation of biodiversity, focusing exclusively on the commercial value of genetic 
8 Id.
9 David P A, The Evolution of Intellectual Property Institutions and the Panda s Thumb, paper presented 
at the Meetings of the International Economic Association, Moscow, August 1992. 
10 Decision of the US Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
11 In 1985, the US Patent and Trademark Offi ce (PTO) ruled that plants could qualify under the utility 
patent laws. In 1987, the US PTO ruled that animals are also patentable. As a result of these decisions, 
virtually all living organisms in the US, including human genetic material, became patentable subject 
matter.
12 Laird S A (ed.), Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge. Equitable Partnerships in Practice, WWF, 
2002. 
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resources to the detriment of non-monetary values. It comes as no surprise that precisely 
the countries behind the establishment of global rules and standards for IPR protection 
have been those where the main corporations, investing in research and development in 
search of new commercial products, are located. 
As it has been explained above, intellectual property law, which includes patents as well 
as trade marks, industrial designs and geographic indications, arose from the needs of 
inventors during the industrial revolution, while the owners and keepers of biological 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge have different customs, institutions and 
needs which are not adequately refl ected in the current global framework. In no unclear 
terms, the UN has found that despite industrialised countries  commitments included in 
the TRIPS Agreement, „they have taken no real steps to share their technology in the 
interests of reducing poverty“13. 
The evolution of IPR regimes in industrialised countries, led by the US and Europe, has 
been characterised by the widening of the subject matter subject to IPR protection (e.g. 
the extension of patent protection to cover life-forms, cell lines and DNA sequences); the 
creation of new rights, such as plant breeders  rights; and the progressive standardisation 
of the basic features of IPRs (such as 20-year protection terms; prior art searches; and 
requirement to examine applications for their novelty, inventive step and industrial appli-
cation, among others). However, the situation was far from homogeneous, with countries 
such as France, Belgium and Italy granting patents on the basis of registration until the 
1960s, and many European countries having lifted the bar to the patentability of pharma-
ceutical products only in the 1960s and 1970s14. At the same time, a few developing coun-
tries were moving in the opposite direction on the same issues: Brasil and India adopted 
laws to exclude pharmaceuticals from patentability in the late 1960s and early 1970s15. 
2.2  IPRs and development
The contribution of IPR regimes to access to technologies by developing countries, a cru-
cial factor for their development, and the role of IPR protection in reducing poverty and 
promoting progress in developing countries, is being increasingly studied. However, lack 
of information and data regarding developing countries have resulted in emerging conclu-
sions and trends pointing towards confl icting messages on the relationship between IPRs 
and development. A 2001 report commissioned by the World Intellectual Property Organ-
isation (WIPO) states that, although studies have generally shown a positive connec-
tion between IPRs and both foreign direct investment (FDI) and imports, results are not 
13 UNDP, 2003 Human Development Report, Chapter 8, Oxford University Press, 2003.
14 Dutfi eld G, Literature survey on intellectual property rights and sustainable human development, 
February 2002. See at http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/bioblipr.pdf
15 Id.
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consistent for all sectors  for reasons which are not entirely explained 16. The paper adds 
that  there is compelling evidence that stronger IPRs do indeed provide some domestic 
benefi ts for developing nations ,  a factor which the author considers particularly relevant 
 in the WTO era when governments have fewer policy options available . 
A different conclusion was however reached by the UK Commission on Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, an independent body set up in May 2001 by the British government and which 
released its fi nal report in September 2002. The Commission s report set out a number 
of recommendations on IPRs and their links to efforts to reduce poverty in developing 
countries. Some of the Commission s conclusions on the effects of IPRs on development 
were that17: 
• There is some evidence that trade fl ows into developing countries are infl uenced by 
the strength of IPR protection, particularly for industries that are  IPR sensitive  such 
as chemicals and pharmaceuticals, but the evidence is far from clear;
• The evidence that foreign investment is positively associated with IPR protection in 
most developing countries is lacking; and
• Most of the evidence concerning the role of IPRs in trade and investment relates to 
those developing countries that are more technologically advanced. For other devel-
oping countries, any benefi cial trade and investment effects are unlikely to outweigh 
the costs, at least in the short and medium term.
The UK Commission on IPRs and other research and discussion fora18 on intellectual 
property policy issues and their impact on development have identifi ed IPRs as a tool to 
promote innovation and contribute to increasing developing countries  competitiveness, 
rather than as an end in themselves. IPR policies should be linked to and respond to the 
national circumstances and development strategies of developing countries, and not be 
forced upon them unconnected to their development needs and priorities.
2.3  Patent requirements
The TRIPS Agreement entered into force in 1995 with the establishment of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and is the most relevant WTO agreement in relation to bio-
diversity, including plant varieties. TRIPS was one of the most controversial agreements 
16 Lesser W, The effects of TRIPS-mandated intellectual property rights on economic activities in devel-
oping countries, April 2001, at http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/studies/pdf/ssa_lesser_TRIPS.pdf
17 Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy, UK Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights, London, September 2002.
18 ICTSD-UNCTAD Dialogue on Development and Intellectual Property, 18-21 September 2003, 
Bellagio, Italy. See meeting report at http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/docs/
Bellagio2_Report.pdf
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of the  WTO package  and the compromise reached included an extended deadline for 
developing countries to implement it, as they were granted fi ve extra years to comply (i.e. 
by January 2000), while least developed countries (LDCs) have until January 200619. The 
requirements of the TRIPS Agreement are considered the  minimum level  of global IPR 
protection, and so countries need to implement those minimum IPR standards. The har-
monised global standards established by TRIPS represent signifi cant changes for many 
countries, especially for developing countries. Most of them did not have any legislation 
on IPRs prior to joining the WTO, as this was not considered a priority, while the link 
between IPRs and progress in development levels has yet to be proven.
The TRIPS Agreement requires all WTO members to provide  minimum  standards of 
protection for a wide range of IPRs, including patents, copyright, trademarks, and geo-
graphical indications, and it incorporates provisions from many existing international 
agreements on IPRs which are administered by WIPO (see section 4.2). Although the 
details and interpretation vary from country to country, there are three main requirements 
for patentability, established by the TRIPS Agreement. Patents must be available for: (i) 
any invention, whether products or processes, (ii) in all fi elds of technology, and (iii) pro-
vided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial applica-
tion (emphasis added). The TRIPS Agreement adds a note further explaining that for the 
purposes of such provision, the terms “inventive step” and “capable of industrial appli-
cation” may be deemed by a Member to be synonymous with the terms “non-obvious” 
and “useful”, respectively, which mirror their US interpretation. The TRIPS Agreement 
allows WTO members to establish exceptions from the general obligation of patentabil-
ity for “any inventions”. The exceptions to this rule are included in Article 27(3)(b) and 
concern plants and animals. However, countries are obliged to protect micro-organisms 
and certain biotechnological processes through patents, and therefore no exceptions are 
permitted for them. 
Article 27(3)(b) is one of the most controversial provisions of the TRIPS Agreement 
and a good example of an international compromise reached between opposite positions, 
which is why some countries consider that it goes too far in its minimum rules on patent-
ing, while others argue that it does not go far enough. Although this Article allows a cer-
tain degree of fl exibility to determine whether patents on animals or plants can be granted 
by WTO members, there is no room for discretion in the case of micro-organisms, which 
must be subject to patenting in any case20. Many developing countries have expressed 
19 The Doha Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health allowed 10 extra years 
for LDCs  implementation of the agreement in respect of pharmaceutical products (i.e. until 1 January 
2016).WTO document WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, of 20 November 2001.
20 See UNCTAD-ICTSD  Resource Book on TRIPS and Development. An Authoritative and Practical 
Guide to the TRIPS Agreement ,2003. 
 (NB. the exceptions to patentability of Article 27.2 of the TRIPS Agreement also apply: “Members 
may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of the commercial ex-
ploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal 
or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is 
not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law“).
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concern about these measures in light of some landmark cases where developed countries 
have granted patents based on genetic resources or traditional knowledge from develop-
ing countries. Article 27(3)(b) has also generated a lot of debate as it addresses patents 
related to the use of biotechnology on biological materials. 
An important element in the ongoing controversy regarding this provision is the mandate 
to review subparagraph 27(3)(b) four years after the entry into force of WTO (i.e. by 
1999). There has been no progress on this issue so far, as developed countries hold the 
view that a “review of implementation” should be conducted, while developing countries 
argue that the “review” must include the revision of the provision itself21.
In the context of plant genetic resources, it must be clarifi ed that when plants have been 
subject to technical or technological interventions for the production of new plant varie-
ties, they are subject to a different regime and therefore not covered by the patentability 
exception. Plant varieties are considered new organisms, different from wild plants as 
found in nature, and require protection through patents or sui generis (meaning  of its 
own kind  or  special ) regimes. This different treatment of plant varieties in the TRIPS 
Agreement refl ected the lack of consensus among negotiating countries, mainly between 
the US and Europe22, although since then their standards are becoming closer. While the 
1973 European Patent Convention states that plant and animals are not patentable23, there 
has been differing interpretations of this provision which led to the adoption in 1998 of 
an EU Directive24 to standardise patents in EU countries. The directive does not totally 
exempt plant varieties from patentability, as biological material isolated from its natural 
environment or produced by a technical process “may be the subject of an invention even 
if it previously occurred in nature”25, a provision which has been criticised by NGOs and 
by some EU countries themselves.
A major impact of the increased used of biotechnology on seed and plant production, 
whose results are subject to patent or patent-like rights such as plant breeders rights, has 
been the promotion of the control of the private sector over crops and agricultural prac-
tices, making farmers liable for royalty payments and changing their traditional practices 
by restricting their use and exchange of seeds. 
With regard to globalisation and food safety, the introduction and strengthening of IPRs 
in agriculture raises concerns that  over-patentability  in the agro-biotechnology industry 
may have the potential to stifl e innovation rather than promote it, both in the public and 
21 ICTSD-UNCTAD Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, Part II: Substantive Obligations. See 
at http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/ResourceBookIndex.htm
22 Stewart T (ed.), The GATT Uruguay Round. A Negotiating History (1986-1992): Introduction and 
Overview, Kluwer Law, 1993.
23 Article 53 of the 1973 European Patent Convention.
24 Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions (Offi cial 
Journal L 213, 1998).
25 Id, Article 3(2).
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private sectors26. In addition, the implications of IPR policies on research priorities and 
funding points towards a more likely focus on the development of commercially sound 
products rather than on the needs of individuals and communities living in poverty27. 
The private sector is a major player in biotechnology research globally. The biggest life 
science companies have a reported investment of some US$2.6 billion in agricultural 
research and development in 1998, but only a small share of this amount is directed at 
developing countries. Most private sector investment in biotechnology R&D takes place 
through: (i) direct investment by global life science companies; (ii) acquisition by these 
companies of seed companies in developing countries, and (iii) through alliances between 
global and local companies28.
Finally, it is interesting to consider some of the recommendations by the UK Commission 
on IPRs on the patent system, addressed to developing countries from the perspective of 
their development needs and options29:
• Exclude from patentability plants and animals and adopt a restrictive defi nition of 
micro-organisms;
• Avoid using the patent system to protect plant varieties and where possible, genetic 
material;
• Provide for international exhaustion of patent rights;
• Apply strict standards of novelty, inventive step and industrial application or utility 
(consider higher standards than currently applied in developed countries);
• Make use of strict patentability and disclosure requirements to prevent unduly broad 
claims in patent applications;
• Provide means to prevent the granting or enforcement of patents comprising biologi-
cal material or associated traditional knowledge obtained in contravention of access 
legislation or the provisions of the CBD.
In conclusion, the international patent system is based on the value system of Western 
countries, which provides for exclusive individual rights as an incentive for industrial 
innovation. Developed countries designed their IPR regimes in accordance with their 
own needs and circumstances and then placed made their tailor-made regimes the glo-
bal IPR standard for all countries. The Western values that IPRs represent often clash 
with those of developing countries. The privatisation and commodifi cation of life and 
bio diversity through patents on living matter, which in some countries extend to human 
genetic material, is alien to many countries and communities in the developing world. 
However, they cannot opt out from the TRIPS agreement as the WTO was negotiated as 
a  package deal .  
26 Cullet P, Food Security and Intellectual Property Rights in Developing Countries, IELRC Working 
Paper 2003-3.
27 Id.
28 Byerlee D and Fischer K, Accessing Modern Science: Policy and Institutional Options for
Agricultural Biotechnology in Developing Countries, World Development Vol. 30 Issue 6, 2002.
29 See n.17.
Intellectual Property Rights and Biological Resources 15
Wuppertal Institut für Klima, Umwelt, Energie GmbH
3.  IPRs, biodiversity and traditional knowledge 
Concerns have been raised by developing countries and civil society about the impacts 
of IPRs on biodiversity, traditional knowledge systems and farmers  rights. Patents and 
plant breeders  rights over plant varieties require these to be genetically uniform, which 
favours the commercial production of seeds at a global scale rather than locally adapted 
varieties. The cultivation of uniform varieties is both linked to the loss of agro-biodiver-
sity and to the increase of genetic erosion, making crops more vulnerable to diseases. 
IPRs play an important role in this equation as they provide incentives to develop seeds 
that can be used in a large market and which derive profi ts through IPRs. Some of the 
main effects of IPRs on biodiversity have been identifi ed as30: decreased crop diversity; 
decreased spatial genetic diversity; increased temporal genetic diversity, and increased 
use of external inputs. 
The FAO has estimated that 1.2 billion people live in poverty across the developing 
world31. Although the relative importance of rural poverty varies from country to coun-
try, more than 70 percent of total poverty in developing countries is found in rural areas, 
where farming is the main basis of local livelihoods. The impacts of IPR laws in devel-
oping countries are potentially very negative for small farmers, with 1.4 billion people 
depending on saved seed while patents take away this traditional practice of farmers32, 
also considered a so-called farmers   privilege .  Patents can also make seeds more expen-
sive for small farmers due to royalty payments, restrictive contracts and increased com-
mercialisation, which compromise farmers  rights to save, grow, exchange and sell seed. 
Farmers  indigenous variety of seeds not only ensures biodiversity but also the livelihood 
of poor farmers. Genetic diversity in agriculture enables poor farmers and breeders to 
select varieties of plants and animal breeds that are best adapted to changing environmen-
tal, economic and social pressures33. 
According to ActionAid34, six corporations (Aventis, Dow, Du Pont, Mitsui, Monsanto 
and Syngenta) are buying up local seed markets in the developing world and controlling 
global markets, jointly holding 98 per cent of the global market for patented genetically 
modifi ed (GM) crops, 70 per cent of the global pesticide market, and 30 per cent of the 
global seed market. The same study reported that those six major agrochemical corpora-
tions hold the vast majority of the 918 patents on rice, maize, wheat, soybean and sor-
ghum, with 633 patents, or nearly 69 per cent, on the staples that are vital for the poor, a 
30 UNCTAD-ICTSD, Intellectual Property Rights: Implications for Development, Policy Discussion 
Paper, August 2003.
31 Dixon J, Gulliver A and Gibbon D, Farming Systems and Poverty: Improving farmers  livelihoods in a 
changing world, FAO/World Bank, 2001.
32 Madeley J, Crops and robbers, ActionAid, October 2001.
33 Lewis J (ed.), TRIPS ON TRIAL: The Impact of WTO s Patent Regime on the World s Farmers, the 
Poor and Developing Countries, Action Aid, Berne Declaration, IATP, Misereor, September 2001. 
34 See n. 32.
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fi gure which rises to 76 per cent in the case of soybean. Patents are considered to promote 
the consolidation of global seed and agro-chemical businesses, concentrating power over 
seeds and seed choices in very few hands35. 
The private sector has stressed36 that the gap between access to genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge and the release of a product is a long one, involving considerable 
investment to develop the original resources into suitable products. In addition, not all 
trials result in commercial successes, which may in turn affect the fl ow of benefi ts to the 
source country or the communities involved. 
In the area of traditional knowledge, the World Health Organization (WHO) has estimated 
the global market for traditional therapies as reaching US$ 60 billion a year, and rapidly 
growing37. The WHO has also identifi ed the need to establish policies on the protection of 
indigenous knowledge given the risks raised by the impacts that further commercialisa-
tion and unregulated use of traditional plants and medicines may have for those who rely 
on these materials as their primary or even only source of health care. 
In addition, the UN Sub-Commission for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights 
unanimously adopted a resolution on “Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights” in 
August 2000, stating that the TRIPS Agreement could infringe the rights of the world s 
poorest to access seeds and pharmaceuticals38. The resolution recognises that there is a 
confl ict between the  private  interests of IPR holders and the  social  or  public  concerns 
embodied in international human rights law, and requested governments to “integrate into 
their national and local legislations and policies, provisions, in accordance with interna-
tional human rights obligations and principles, that protect the social function of intel-
lectual property”39.
A 2001 study by the FAO and the World Bank40 outlined key strategic priorities for action 
to accelerate the process of decline in hunger and poverty in developing regions, with a 
focus on creating dynamic rural communities based on prosperous farming. The paper 
concluded with a list of proposed actions aimed at contributing towards achieving the 
global target of halving hunger and poverty by 2015. The central message of this FAO/
World Bank study is the great potential that improvement of smallholder farming systems 
has for reducing hunger and poverty, since half of the population of developing regions, 
and a majority of the hungry and the poor, are farmers and their families. However, it is 
35 Tripathi R, Food patenting — A threat to food security, ActionAid, 2001.
36 Bennet A (Executive Director of the Syngenta Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture), Saving genes 
through improved access and benefi t sharing, Symposium on Food Security and Biodiversity, 16 
October 2003, Basel, Switzerland. See at http://www.syngentafoundation.com/pdf/andrew_bennett_
genes_benefi t_sharing.pdf 
37 World Health Organisation, Press release WHO/38, of 16 May 2002.
38 UN Resolution E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/L.20.
39 Id.
40 See n.31.
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noticeable that such a study did not include any consideration or reference to the role and 
infl uence of IPR systems, neither as part of the global challenges faced nor in the list of 
ways forward.
The fact that patents on genetic resources do not recognise the rights of local commu-
nities over their traditional knowledge has been raised by numerous developing coun-
tries and NGOs since the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement. Traditional knowledge 
associated to biodiversity is often instrumental in determining the properties or uses of 
resources that form the basis of the  discovery  or  invention  subject to patent. While 
fewer than 1 per cent of fl owering plants have been thoroughly investigated by mod-
ern science, traditional knowledge of their biology and use is great by comparison41. 
However, traditional knowledge systems, including community institutions for con-
servation, exchange and improvement of biological diversity, have also contributed 
to the erosion of traditional knowledge itself. It has been stressed as ironic that many 
countries complain about the unfair way in which traditional knowledge and genetic 
resources are treated at the international level while very few take measures to stop a 
similar exploitation in domestic markets42.
Granting private property rights over the intellectual developments of many previous gen-
erations of farmers raises serious questions in respect to  prior art , and can also viewed 
as a form of intellectual property theft — the so called  bio-piracy 43, also defi ned as  ”the 
illegal appropriation of life — micro-organisms, plants, and animals — and the traditional 
cultural knowledge that accompanies it”44. Meeting the patent requirement of  novelty  
in relation to traditional knowledge is diffi cult due to the need to identify an original 
inventor when one or more families or tribes may share the same knowledge. In addition, 
meeting the test of non-obviousness is also challenging as traditional practices are consid-
ered  unscientifi c  due to the characteristics of oral tradition and the lack of documented 
evidence of much traditional knowledge. 
The view that IPR laws are generally inappropriate and inadequate to protect the rights 
and resources of traditional knowledge-holders and local communities is shared by a 
number of developing countries, NGOs and academics. Some authors have put forward 
the concept of Traditional Resource Rights, which recognise “the inextricable link between 
cultural and biological diversity and sees no contradiction between the human rights of 
indigenous and local communities, including the right to development and environmental 
41 Sheldon J W and Balick M J, Ethnobotany and the search for balance between use and conservation, 
in Swanson T (ed.), ‚Intellectual property rights and biodiversity conservation — An interdisciplinary 
analysis of the values of medicinal plants , Cambridge University Press, 1995.
42 Gupta A K, Rewarding conservation of biological and genetic resources and associated traditional 
knowledge and contemporary grassroots creativity, Indian Institute of Management, January 2003.
43 See n.30. See also Gollin M A, Biopiracy: The Legal Perspective, American Institute of Biological 
Sciences, 2001.
44 DeGeer M E, Biopiracy: The Appropriation of Indigenous Peoples  Cultural Knowledge, New Eng-
land Journal of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 9:1, 2002.
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conservation”45. Others follow a more pragmatic approach in reviewing IPR systems to 
make them  work  for the protection of genetic resources and traditional knowledge, both 
in a positive way, as an incentive for its conservation and protection, and in a negative 
way, by precluding others from patenting them.
There have been numerous examples of controversial cases of patents over genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge, most of them in the US, a non-Party to the CBD. 
Some examples are46: a US patent granted in 1995 for the healing properties of turmeric, 
known for centuries in India; a US patent on the  ayahuasca  plant, considered sacred and 
used for medicinal purposes by Amazon s indigenous peoples; and a US patent for the use 
of a combination of herbal compositions as anti-diabetic agents that have been in use and 
are also well-documented in Indian scientifi c literature and ancient texts for the same anti-
diabetic properties. Another example regarding research and development of commercial 
products based on traditional knowledge associated to a specifi c plant in Southern Africa, 
and the role played by IPRs, is included below, together with an example of patents over 
GM crops in India.
The case of the San people and the hoodia plant: Biodiversity, traditional 
knowledge and IPRs in Southern Africa
The San people are indigenous inhabitants of Southern Africa, numbering around 100,000 
across South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Angola. They formed the Working Group of 
Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa (WIMSA) to protect their rights and interests. 
In 1997 the WIMSA Board of Trustees announced that it would no longer allow free 
access to the San by the media or researchers, and drew up contracts for payment in return 
for access to their lives and ancestral knowledge47. 
Hoodia is a succulent plant that grows throughout the semi-arid areas of Southern Africa. 
The San have traditionally used Hoodia stems to stave off hunger and thirst during their 
long journeys, as it acts as an appetite suppressant. The active ingredient in Hoodia and its 
possible use as a slimming drug have attracted the attention of pharmaceutical companies. 
The active ingredient of the Hoodia cactus was identifi ed by the Council for Scientifi c and 
Industrial Research in South Africa (CSIR). They passed on their work to British com-
pany Phytopharm for further development. Phytopharm then sold the exclusive global 
license to commercialise the drug to Pfi zer, for 21 million US dollars48. 
45 Posey D and Dutfi eld G, Beyond Intellectual Property: Towards Traditional Resource Rights for In-
digenous Peoples and Local Communities, IDRC, 1996.
46 Kothari A and Anuradha R V, Biodiversity and Intellectual Property Rights: Can the Two Co-Exist?, 
2(2) Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy (1999).
47 Berne Declaration, Stolen Knowledge: Article about the Hoodia Cactus, September 2001. 
48 Indigenous plant benefi ts San, SouthAfrica.info reporter, 23 March 2003, see at http://www.southaf-
rica.info/doing_business/economy/success/medicine_270303.htm 
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The chronology of events in this case shows the diffi culty and the long duration of nego-
tiations related to benefi t-sharing agreements, especially considering that access to the 
resource was negotiated in the context of lack of specifi c legislation in South Africa, as 
well as lack of involvement of the knowledge-holders. A summary of events is listed 
below:
• 1996: CSIR scientists isolated the Hoodia s hunger-suppressing chemical component, 
or P57, and patented it. 
• 1997: CSIR licensed to UK-based fi rm Phytopharm the further development and com-
mercialisation of P57 (but CSIR retained the patent).
• 1998: Phytopharm licensed drug giant Pfi zer to develop and market P57.
• July 2001: a Pfi zer spokesman discussing research on P57 mentioned the link to the 
San people but said the San were  extinct .
• November 2001: the South African San Council is established. It opened talks with 
the CSIR demanding recognition of their knowledge and a share of the benefi ts. The 
South Africa San Council negotiated with the CSIR on behalf of the San in Angola, 
Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, as the San will share profi ts across bor-
ders.
• March 2003: the South African San Council and the CSIR signed an agreement recog-
nising and rewarding the San people as traditional knowledge-holders, with a reported 
share of up to eight percent of profi ts from the drug derived from the Hoodia plant49. 
The CSIR agreed to pay the San eight percent of milestone payments, a payment to be 
made by its licensee Phytopharm during the drug s clinical development over the fol-
lowing 3-4 years, with the further agreement that when the drug is marketed, possibly 
in 2008, the San will get six percent of royalties50.
• July 2003: Phytopharm announced that Pfi zer had decided to discontinue the clinical 
development of P57, returning the right to Phytopharm.
• 2004: Canadian and US companies market Hoodia Gordonii coming directly from 
South Africa51. 
The agreement reached includes52 the commitment of both parties “to the conservation 
of biodiversity, including by applying legal  best practices  to the collection of any plant 
species for observation, and by ensuring that no negative environmental impacts will fl ow 
from the proposed bioprospecting collaboration”. In addition, the CSIR acknowledged 
49 CorpWatch press release, South Africa: Indigenous Group Wins Rights to its Healing Herbs, 28 March 
2003.
50 Id.
51 Press release Appetite Be Gone with Hoodia Gordonii Appetite Suppressant, of 21 February 2004, see 
at http://www.prweb.com/releases/2004/2/prwebxml105321.php See also http://www.hoodia-dietpills.
com/, accessed in November 2004.
52 As reported by Dr Terblanche, Executive Director of CSIR Bio/Chemtek, at the Symposium on Food 
Security and Biodiversity, 16 October 2003, Basel, Switzerland. See at http://www.benefi tsharing.
org/pdf/Presentation_Petro_Terblanche.pdf
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“the existence and the importance of the traditional knowledge of the San people, and the 
fact that such body of knowledge, existing for millennia, predated scientifi c knowledge 
developed by Western civilization over the past century”.
The San agreement has been criticised for a number of reasons53: (i) the San will receive 
less than 0.003 per cent of net sales of the product, which will come from the CSIR s 
share, while profi ts received by Phytopharm and Pfi zer will remain unchanged (Pfi zer 
and Phytopharm are not only exempt from sharing their benefi ts but also protected by the 
agreement from any further fi nancial demands by the San); (ii) the agreement explicitly 
prevents the San from using their knowledge of Hoodia in any other commercial applica-
tion; and (iii) the administration of the benefi ts to come, including the determination of 
benefi ciaries and apportioning of the funds across countries and within different com-
munities54, are expected to create confl ict. The wider implications and concerns raised 
by this agreement relate to the patenting and privatisation of knowledge in communities 
where the sharing of knowledge is part of their culture and central to their way of life. On 
the other hand, this agreement has set an important international and national precedent 
in South Africa and neighbouring countries55. 
The case of Bt cotton in India: GMOs, decision-making and multinational 
corporations 
Monsanto pioneered the introduction of a protein of the bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis 
(Bt), into cotton using genetic engineering methods. The result, Bt cotton, is claimed to 
control pests such while reducing the need for pesticides. However, the Bt cotton tech-
nology has also been criticised for promoting monoculture, as widespread propagation of 
genetically modifi ed (GM) varieties precludes the use of other varieties of crops in the 
same area. In addition, such agricultural techniques are especially vulnerable to extensive 
damage by pests and climatic changes like drought. While it has been argued that  all the 
countries that have introduced Bt cotton have derived signifi cant and multiple benefi ts 56, 
such as yield increases and reduced production, with benefi ts between 1998 and 2001 
having been estimated at US$1.7 billion57, doubts have also been cast on the long-term 
benefi ts of Bt cotton, as a study in India found that the protection afforded by Bt gene 
would only last for a maximum period of six years58. 
53 Wynberg R, Sharing the crumbs with the San, 2002, available at http://www.biowatch.org.za/csir-san.
htm
54 It has been agreed to place the potential funds to be received into a  San Hoodia Benefi t Sharing 
Trust .
55 See n.53.
56 James C, Global Review of Commercialized Transgenic Crops: 2001 Feature: Bt Cotton. International 
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, ISAAA Briefs No. 26. 2002, ISAAA 
SEAsiaCenter, Philippines.
57 Id.
58 Chandrasekar K and Gujar G T, Bt Cotton Benefi ts Short-lived: Study, Indian Agricultural Research 
Institute, as reported in the Financial Express (India), 11 February 2004.
Intellectual Property Rights and Biological Resources 21
Wuppertal Institut für Klima, Umwelt, Energie GmbH
India is the third largest producer of cotton, with around 15 per cent of global production. 
Bt cotton was fi rst approved for commercial release in the US in 1996, where Monsanto 
supplies 85 per cent of the cottonseed. In 2002, the fi rst approval for commercial release 
in India was granted by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, on the basis of a three-
year trial period in six states. At the same time, it was reported that Bt cotton had been 
illegally planted over several years in various regions in India. The debate and contro-
versy surrounding the approval of Bt cotton in India linked a number of policy issues and 
factors such as the nature of the GM technology, the control of agriculture by multina-
tionals, and the effectiveness of the regulatory process59. It has also been argued that the 
information available to the public regarding Bt cotton and its effects was  incomplete, 
irrelevant, or obfuscated 60, which resulted in shortcomings in addressing the relevant 
technological and societal issues during the decision-making process to authorise the 
commercial release of Bt cotton. Activists were very critical of the use of scientifi c argu-
ments and data by industry, concluding that India was an example of corporate promotion 
of “an unnecessary, untested, hazardous technology through pseudo science”61, as yields 
of Bt cotton fell by 80 per cent and left farmers with signifi cant economic losses62.
The chronology of events listed below shows the main milestones leading to the deci-
sion to authorise the commercial release of Bt cotton in India. Civil society groups have 
characterised the regulatory process by a lack of transparency and public debate over this 
controversial new technology. Moreover, the Indian government has been criticised for its 
handling of the Bt cotton fi eld trial evaluations by Monsanto 63:
• April 1998: Monsanto is given permission to conduct the fi rst fi eld trials of Bt cotton 
in India;
• November 1998: Thousands of farmers occupied and burned down Bt cotton trial 
fi elds in Karnataka as part of  Operation Cremation Monsanto ;
• January 1999: the Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology went to 
the Supreme Court challenging the “illegality” of the fi eld trials that had been author-
ised;
• July 2000: Large-scale fi eld trials were allowed, including seed production at 40 sites 
in six states. The permission was granted based on “totally confi dential” data from the 
small trials that allowed regulators to infer that Bt Cotton was “safe.” A Committee to 
“independently” monitor and evaluate the large scale fi eld trials was set up;
• June 2001: Field trials of Bt Cotton were extended by another year;
59 Scoones I, Regulatory manoeuvres: The Bt cotton controversy in India, Institute of Development 
Studies, Working Paper 197, UK, August 2003. 
60 Bharathan G, Bt-cotton in India: Anatomy of a controversy, Current Science, Vol. 79, No. 8, 25 Octo-
ber 2000.
61 Shiva V, Biotech Wars: Food Freedom Vs Food Slavery, Research Foundation for Science, Technol-
ogy and Ecology, India, at http://www.vshiva.net/aticles/biotech_wars.htm
62 Id.
63 Chronology of Bt Cotton in India, India Resource Center, 25 March 2002.
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• October 2001: Unauthorised commercial Bt cotton farming is discovered in Gujarat. 
The Indian government ordered those Bt cotton fi elds to be burnt but no action is 
taken after a farmers  protest.
• November 2001: NGO Gene Campaign fi led a case in the Delhi High Court charging 
the Government with negligence in allowing large-scale fi eld trials to be conducted 
without appropriate monitoring, regulation and safety precautions. The  petition 
demanded that GMOs be released only after a rigorous regulatory procedure and an 
evaluation by an independent regulatory agency.
• February 2002: The Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) submitted a pos-
itive report on the fi eld trials of Bt cotton to the Ministry of Environment. 
• March 2002: The Genetic Engineering and Approval Committee (GEAC) of the Min-
istry of Environment approved the commercial use of Bt cotton. 
In April 2003, the Standing Parliamentary Committee in India reported that Bt cotton 
appeared to perform “only marginally” better than conventional varieties, both in terms 
of productivity and resistance to bollworm infection64. The Committee asked the govern-
ment to set up an independent team of experts to re-evaluate the cotton variety s eco-
nomic viability and possible environmental impact. In addition, India-based NGO Gene 
Campaign published a study65 with fi eld data showing that the fi rst harvest of Bt cotton 
had failed, and that the GM crop had proved to be signifi cantly more expensive than tradi-
tional varieties,  leaving farmers in debt . Gene Campaign demanded that Monsanto pay 
compensation to farmers that had suffered losses due to Bt cotton. This information con-
tradicted claims by Monsanto that the three Bt cotton varieties approved for commercial 
release had increased farmers  incomes and led to reduced pesticide use by 65–70 percent 
while increasing yields by 30 percent.
In November 2003, Gene Campaign organised a national symposium on the relevance 
of GM technology to Indian agriculture and food security, which resulted in a set of 20 
recommendations which included the need for a national biotechnology policy66. The 
Indian government disagreed on the need for a separate biotechnology policy and Gene 
Campaign fi led a public interest lawsuit in the Supreme Court of India challenging the 
constitutionality of India s Rules on GMOs. The main requests of the legal challenge, 
fi led in January 2004, were67 the formulation of a national policy on GMOs, through a 
consultative process, and a moratorium on approvals and fi eld trials of GMOs until a 
sound regulatory and monitoring system is in place.
64 BRIDGES Trade BioRes, Bt cotton remains highly controversial in India, Vol.3 No.8, 1 May 2003.
65 Sahai S and Rahman S, Performance of Bt Cotton- Data from First Commercial Crop, 38 Economic & 
Political Weekly, 26 July 2003. 
66 Gene Campaign, Notice Issued to Government on PIL on GM Technology, see at http://www.
genecampaign.org/news/notice_pil.html
67 Id.
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This case illustrates the web of interconnections between the infl uence a powerful multi-
national corporation at the forefront of developments in biotechnology, the shortcomings 
of a regulatory regime, and the role of the public and civil society in challenging politi-
cal and administrative processes and decisions related to economic, environmental and 
health risks with a signifi cant impact on rural livelihoods.
Both cases raise issues that are at the heart of the international debate on biodiversity, tra-
ditional knowledge and intellectual property rights. On the one hand, they provide valu-
able experience and information on  real life  situations and the application of the global 
rules under development. However, on the other hand, these cases alert us to signifi cant 
risks and shortcomings in dealing with these emerging issues, and the  real  problems 
they are creating. 
From a legal perspective, these cases illustrate the complex and highly technical nature of 
the new frameworks to deal with benefi t sharing, in the case of the Hoodia plant and the 
San people, and the regulation and promotion of a new technology, in the case of Bt cotton 
in India. The provision of information and opportunities for effective public participation 
lacked in both cases, which involved sizeable multinational corportations. In the Hoodia 
case, the company eventually acknowledged the claims of local communities and reached 
and agreement with their representatives. This benefi t sharing agreement has received 
criticisms and praise from different sectors, but it has certainly broken new ground and 
it will an important precedent for future negotiations. Its application will determine the 
effectiveness of the arrangement, which will also provide lessons to be learned for future 
agreements of this kind.
A different issue which should also be studied in the future is the effect that the new 
international regimes on agro-biodiversity, traditional knowledge, and IPRs, are having 
in the way local and indigenous communities operate. Global rules promote the privati-
sation and commercialisation of knowledge and wild varieties, which represent funda-
mental changes to the culture and values of many indigenous peoples and communities. 
Global trade and economic rules also make corporations stronger, and their involvement 
in local and internationl politics and policies is also increasing. Whether the new inter-
national regimes on biodiversity, trade, and IPRs will provide adequate checks and bal-
ances between regulations, corporations, citizens and consumers remains to be seen, but 
if we get it wrong there will not be a second chance for many communities, wildlife, and 
crops.
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4.  International governance of biodiversity and 
intellectual property rights
This section attempts to present an overview of the main international fora and debates 
surrounding the regulation of biodiversity and IPRs, focusing on ongoing discussions 
and negotiations at the CBD, WTO, and WIPO. This section summarises and highlights 
the main positions of countries, NGOs, and the private sector, regarding the relationship 
between biodiversity, trade and IPRs, and the way it should be addressed and regulated.
4.1  The CBD and IPRs
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) entered into force in December 1993 and 
has 188 Parties, which makes it a truly  global treaty .  The CBD aims are to conserve bio-
diversity, ensure its sustainable use, and achieve a fair and equitable sharing of any ben-
efi ts derived from biological genetic resources. The reference to  fairness  and  equity  
represents an innovative element in a biodiversity convention, marking a shift from previ-
ous wildlife agreements focusing primarily on nature conservation. The CBD introduces 
an ethical element as regards the way of sharing the benefi ts derived from permitted uses 
of biological diversity. 
The CBD defi nes genetic resources as  genetic material of actual or potential value  of 
plant, animal, microbial or other origin, containing  functional units of heredity 68. The 
scope of the biological diversity covered by the CBD encompasses species, populations 
and other biotic components found in terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems. As 
the CBD Preamble recognises, there is still a widespread lack of information and knowl-
edge about biodiversity, although there is concern about its  signifi cant reduction  and the 
need to  anticipate, prevent and attack  the causes of its decline at source.
The scope and objectives of the CBD refl ect to a great extent the position of developing 
countries during the negotiations of this convention, as they host the majority of the bio-
diversity on the planet. One of the objectives of the G-7769 during the negotiations of the 
CBD was to ensure that the importance and value of biological resources was adequately 
recognised in the CBD. Developing countries set as conditions for their participation in 
the CBD negotiations that the new treaty should include specifi c obligations and measures 
68 Article 3, CBD.
69 The Group of 77 (G-77) was established in 1964 by seventy-seven developing countries. It is the 
 largest coalition of developing countries in the United Nations and its aim is ‚to provide the means for 
the developing world to articulate and promote its colelctive economic interests and enhance its joint 
negotiating capacity on all major international economic issues in the UN system . See http://www.
g77.org
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regarding three types of  access : (i) access to genetic resources; (ii) access to technology 
(including biotechnology); and (iii) access of countries providers of genetic resources to 
the benefi ts derived from the use of their genetic material70. 
The CBD is the fi rst international treaty to link access to genetic resources and the right 
to the equitable sharing of benefi ts related to those resources, which can be found in Arti-
cles 1, 8(j), 15, 16 and 19 as the main CBD provisions on access to genetic resources and 
equitable benefi t sharing. The CBD establishes the principle of national sovereignty as 
the basis for the regulation of access to genetic resources and benefi t sharing. States are 
sovereign to regulate access, including who should give consent, who should participate 
in the negotiation of the terms and conditions of that access, and who should receive a 
 fair and equitable  share of the benefi ts 
More than ten years after the entry into force of the CBD, achieving its three objectives 
remains a challenge. The circumstances that led to the adoption of this international con-
vention have not greatly improved as we still lack  basic  biodiversity data such as the 
total number of species on Earth or how many become extinct each year. However, a 
very specifi c objective was set at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(WSSD): to achieve  a signifi cant reduction of the current rate of biodiversity loss by 
2010 . At the WSSD, the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation was adopted, including 
a section on biodiversity which states that the current trend of biodiversity loss due to 
human activities  can only be reversed if the local people benefi t from the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological diversity, in particular in countries of origin of genetic 
resources, in accordance with Article 15 of the CBD 71.
The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation went beyond the CBD as countries agreed on 
the need to negotiate  an international regime to promote and safeguard the fair and equi-
table sharing of benefi ts arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources 72. CBD COP-7, 
in February 2004, discussed and adopted the terms of reference for the negotiation of an 
international regime on access to genetic resources and benefi t sharing, with two negotia-
tion meetings scheduled before the next COP in 2006. Agreement on the scope, elements 
and modalities of such a regime will be hard to achieve judging by the very diffi cult nego-
tiations at COP-7 on the terms of reference for the negotiations themselves. CBD Parties 
could not agree on whether the international regime should be legally binding or not, an 
issue which remains open and which could crucially determine the way the negotiations 
are conducted in the coming years.
70  A Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity ,  Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 30. 
IUCN Environmental Law Centre, Gland (Switzerland), 1996.
71 Paragraph 44 of the WSSD Plan of Implementation. A/CONF.199/20.
72 Id, para.44(o).
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The only explicit reference to IPRs in the CBD is found in Article 16(5), which recognises 
that  patents and other intellectual property rights may have an infl uence on the imple-
mentation of this Convention , and so CBD Parties must co-operate  in order to ensure 
that such rights are supportive of and do not run counter to its objectives . IPRs are also 
mentioned in relation to developing countries  access to technology protected by patents 
and other IPRs, as well as to the transfer of that technology to developing countries. 
Article 16(3) includes another linkage between access to genetic resources and IPRs as it 
establishes that developing country providers of genetic resources should have access to, 
and transfer of, the technology that uses those resources.
Since the establishment of the WTO and the entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement, 
there has been a call, mainly be developing countries, to explore the relationship between 
CBD and IPRs. In parallel, CBD COP decisions73 have stressed the need to gather infor-
mation on the impact of IPRs on achieving the objectives of the CBD74, and to explore 
the relationship between the Convention and the TRIPS Agreement75. The relationship 
between the two regimes has been partly facilitated by the fact that the CBD Secretariat 
is admitted as an observer to the meetings of the WTO Committee on Trade and Environ-
ment, although the application to get observer status at the TRIPS Council has not yet 
been resolved76 77.
CBD Parties have not been able to reach agreement on the role of IPRs in the application 
of the access and benefi t sharing provisions of the CBD, with a number of areas having 
been identifi ed as needing further research. These are78: (i) the use of IPRs to strengthen 
prior informed consent (by requiring that IPR applicants submit evidence that the prior 
consent has been obtained from the owner of the resource or traditional knowledge); (ii) 
the role of IPRs in the protection of traditional knowledge; and (iii) the scope and impact 
of IPRs on legitimate interests of other stakeholders.
In 2002, the Sixth meeting of the Parties to the CBD (COP-6) adopted the non-bind-
ing Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefi ts79. They include IPRs as a possible benefi t derived from the utilisation of genetic 
resources. Appendix I of the Bonn Guidelines recommends that it should be agreed 
whether IPR applications based on the genetic materials accessed are allowed and, if so, 
73  Handbook of the Convention on Biological Diversity ,  CBD Secretariat, 2nd edition, 2003, 
pp.176–177.
74 CBD COP Decisions II/12 and II/17, para.1.
75 CBD COP Decisions III/17, IV/15, para.9; V/26B, para.2; and VI/24D.
76 CBD COP Decisions V/26B, para.4 and VI/24D, para.1. The latest offi cial application for observer 
status in the TRIPS Council was made in July 2000.
77 See IP/C/W/52/Rev.10, of 26 April 2002.
78 Report of the Panel of Experts on Access and Benefi t-Sharing , UNEP/CBD/COP/5/8, of 2 Nov. 1999, 
paragraphs 132–138.
79 COP Decision VI/24 Part A.
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under what conditions. The possibility of  joint ownership of relevant intellectual prop-
erty rights  also appears in the indicative lists of monetary and non-monetary benefi ts 
included in Appendix II of the Bonn Guidelines. 
COP-6  invited  CBD Parties to80  encourage  the disclosure of the country of origin of 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge in IPR applications, such as patents , that 
make use of those resources and knowledge. One of the objectives of this disclosure would 
be to help track compliance with the CBD requirement that access to genetic resources 
must be based on prior informed consent and mutually agreed terms. 
COP-6 also addressed the issue of sui generis or specifi c and distinct regimes for the 
protection of traditional knowledge81, and the outcome was also to  invite  CBD Parties 
to82  encourage  the disclosure of the origin of traditional knowledge, innovations and 
practices of indigenous and local communities in applications for IPRs that use of such 
knowledge, and to  take into account  traditional knowledge when examining the novelty 
and inventive step requirements in patent applications. The language used in the CBD 
COP decisions refl ects the diffi culty to reach agreement in these matters to give a clear 
policy direction. The consensus rule of decision-making within the CBD framework leads 
to most compromises being made close to the common lowest denominator among the 
188 Parties, which is why on a controversial issue such as IPRs, no stronger terms than 
 encourage ,  invite  or  take into account  are agreed upon, as some countries would 
like to delete these reference while others would like to make them stronger. However, 
they should also be read as refl ecting a trend in international discussions that is gaining 
momentum and which groups of countries are defending in different fora, which may lead 
to more binding obligations in the future.
In February 2004, COP-7 continued this debate and CBD Parties were  invited  to rec-
ognise that traditional knowledge, “whether written or oral, may constitute prior art”83. 
Patents are subject to the full disclosure of the invention, which contributes to further 
innovations and promotes the advancement of science and technology. Disclosure is 
therefore crucial to determine whether the claimed invention is  new  and  non-obvious ,  
as information in the public domain cannot be patented. Disclosing the traditional knowl-
edge used in an invention or part of prior art creates an incentive for the maintenance of 
traditional knowledge systems. In addition, the status of traditional knowledge would be 
promoted by being widely and universally accepted within the IPR protection system84.
80 Id, Part C, paras.1 and 2.
81 CBD COP Decision VI/10F, para.34.
82 Id, at paras.46 and 48.
83 Decision VII/19, Part E, para. 3
84 Ruiz M, The international debate on traditional knowledge as prior art in the patent system: Issues and 
options for developing countries, CIEL, October 2002.
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Current priorities regarding these issues include consideration of the disclosure of the 
origin of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge in IPR applications, 
including a proposed  international certifi cate of origin, source or legal provenance of 
the resources and associated knowledge 85, which could be used in patent applications to 
prove that the resources and/or associated knowledge were legally acquired. 
The CBD system has not stopped the loss and destruction of biodiversity. New global 
biodiversity targets recognise the need to fully involve local and indigenous peoples 
and communities in the governance regime of CBD implementation if we are to at least 
 reduce  the rate of biodiversity loss. The CBD is based on national sovereignty, and 
national governments are to regulate access to genetic resoruces and benefi t sharing, but 
the equity element of ensuring a  fair and equitable  sharing of the benefi ts derived from 
biodiversity has not been adequately addressed yet and is partly responsible for the lack 
of progress in the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, the other two objec-
tives of the CBD.
4.2  CBD and WIPO
The CBD works closely and exchanges information with the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) on these matters. CBD COP-6 asked WIPO to prepare a techni-
cal study on possible methods for requiring the disclosure in patent applications of the 
genetic resources used; their country of origin; any associated traditional knowledge and 
its source; and evidence of prior informed consent86. A  Draft Technical Study on Disclo-
sure Requirements related to Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge  was consid-
ered by WIPO s General Assembly at the end of September 200387 and submitted to CBD 
COP-7 in February 2004  as a technical reference document  and not  to advocate any par-
ticular approach nor to expound a defi nitive interpretation of any treaty 88. COP-7 invited 
WIPO to examine a number of specifi c questions regarding access to genetic resources 
and the disclosure requirements in IPR applications89, including: practical options for IPR 
application procedures with regard to the trigger of disclosure requirements; implications 
for the functioning of disclosure requirements in various WIPO treaties, and IPR issues 
raised by the proposed international certifi cate of origin/source/legal provenance; and 
regularly provide reports to the CBD on this work,  in the spirit of mutual supportive-
ness .
85 COP Decision VII/19, Part E, para.7.
86 CBD COP Decision VI/24C, para.4.
87 WO/GA/30/7 Add.1
88 UNEP/CBD/COP/7/INF/17, of 15 December 2003.
89 CBD COP Decision VII/19, Part E, (preamble and paragraph 8).
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WIPO is a UN specialised agency that administers 23 international treaties related to 
IPRs90, and has 180 member states. Its mandate is the promotion and the protection of 
intellectual property throughout the world through co-operation among states and, where 
appropriate, in collaboration with any other international organisations91. Interestingly, 
WIPO is the only UN agency that is largely self-funding, as it fi nances its activities from 
the revenue it obtains through the provision of services to the private sector in the form 
of international registration and fi ling of patents, trademarks, and designs: 91 per cent of 
WIPO s budget comes from fees paid by the private sector for its services under the Pat-
ent Cooperartion Treaty, with contributions by member states amounting to less than 10 
per cent of the agency s overall budget92.
One of WIPO s programmes ( Global Intellectual Property Issues )  has a sub-programme 
on  Biological Diversity and Biotechnology . At the WIPO General Assembly in 2000, 
it was decided that a distinct body should be established to facilitate discussions about 
intellectual property and genetic resources among WIPO member states. To this end, 
the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Tradi-
tional Knowledge and Folklore ( IGC ) was established, with a work programme which 
included the determination of the scope of  traditional knowledge  in order to discuss the 
type of protection which can be provided by IPRs; the consideration of existing and new 
criteria which would allow the effective integration of data about disclosed traditional 
knowledge into searchable prior art; and the consideration of ways to assist traditional 
knowledge holders in relation to the enforcement of IPRs, in particular by assisting them 
to strengthen their capacity to enforce their rights.
At the fi rst session of the IGC, it was agreed that the Intergovernmental Committee should 
address the issues before it in conjunction with the CBD Secretariat as its work should be 
consistent with and complementary to the work carried out by the CBD, both on access 
to genetic resources and on the implementation of Article 8(j) on traditional knowledge. 
The CBD COP invited WIPO to take account of the lifestyles and the traditional systems 
of access to and use of the knowledge, technologies and practices of indigenous and local 
communities in its work, as well as the relevant recommendations of the COP93.
The IGC has met seven times since September 2000 and has addressed the protection 
of traditional knowledge both through conventional IPR systems and through distinct 
sui generis systems of protection. The IGC has been working on the steps that need to 
be taken to safeguard the interests of the communities who have developed and pre-
served traditional knowledge and cultures. In July 2003, the IGC Secretariat produced 
a composite study which included approaches to defi nitions of traditional knowledge, 
90 WIPO s mission is to encourage creative activity, while its mandate is to promote the protection of 
intellectual property throughout the world (Visions and Strategic Direction of WIPO, 1999).
91 WIPO Constitution Online,. See at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo029en.htm#P68_2905
92 WIPO Press Release PR/2001/288, of 25 September 2001.
93 CBD COP Decision IV/9, para.16.
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national experiences in its protection and an analysis of elements of a sui generis system. 
This document drew together the information about the intellectual property protection 
of traditional knowledge that had been considered by the Committee, including surveys 
of national mechanisms for the protection of traditional knowledge, specifi c sui generis 
laws, case studies on the use of intellectual property to protect traditional knowledge, and 
an analysis by the Secretariat of issues such as operational defi nitions and elements of sui 
generis protection of traditional knowledge, as well as material gathered in consultations 
with holders of traditional knowledge that the Secretariat conducted in 1998-1999. 
The IGC was mandated by WIPO s General Assembly as a forum for discussion of these 
issues and the General Assembly had to consider whether to renew its mandate at a meet-
ing in September 2003. Extensive debate was held over the IGC s future direction, includ-
ing the possibility of moving beyond the initial mandate of serving as a forum for dis-
cussion. There was strong support for the position that the IGC should move towards 
concrete outcomes within the next two years, focusing on the international aspects of 
protecting traditional knowledge, but views differed over the appropriate form and legal 
status of these outcomes94. Countries were strongly divided over pursuing an international 
regime for the protection of genetic resources, traditional knowledge and folklore. While 
the African Group demanded that negotiations on a legally-binding regime begin in the 
next two years, Latin American and Asian countries proposed the development of a set 
of principles with the possibility of a binding regime. In addition, the US opposed the 
negotiation of a binding regime at the current time. 
The WIPO General Assembly meeting in late 2003 extended the mandate of the IGC for a 
further two years. The IGC was requested to accelerate its work and to focus on the inter-
national dimension of intellectual property and genetic resources, traditional knowledge 
and folklore. The expected outcome of the IGC s work to be included in the mandate was 
very contentious. While many developed countries continued to resist demands by the 
African Group to include references to a legally binding instrument, Brazil, Andean and 
Caribbean states reiterated their call for joint recommendations as the IGC s outcome. 
There was fi nal agreement on the statement that  no outcome of its work is excluded, 
including the possible development of an international instrument or instruments 95. In 
addition, the mandate stated that discussions in the ICG should be  without prejudice 
to the work in other fora , which could provide an opening for developing countries to 
advance their agenda in the TRIPS Council. Some developing countries long opposed 
to addressing these issues at the WTO are reconsidering their positions on the scope of 
future TRIPS negotiations given the inclusion of stricter IPR requirements in bilateral and 
regional trade agreements with countries such as the US, EU and Nordic countries, and 
also in the light of the ongoing  patent agenda  negotiations in WIPO. 
94 Next steps for international protection of traditional knowledge in view, WIPO Update 201/2003, of 
21 July 2003.
95 See BRIDGES Trade BioRes, Vol. 3 No. 17, of 3 October 2003.
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At the IGC meeting in March 2004, Brasil, the African Group and other developing coun-
tries questioned the mandate of the IGC to respond to the invitation by CBD COP-7 
to assess the interrelation between access to genetic resources and possible disclosure 
requirements in IPR applications. Those countries also expressed their concern about the 
lack of co-ordination between the IGC and other debates that are currently taking place 
within WIPO, such as the negotiations on the Patent Cooperation Treaty regarding pat-
ents. Views on the preference for the TRIPS Council to deal with these issues were also 
expressed at the March 2004 meeting96. 
The latest IGC meeting was held on 1–5 November 2004, after WIPO s General Assem-
bly adopted a decision in October 2004 to consider the integration of a  development 
agenda  into all WIPO bodies97, and to establish a process to respond to the request from 
CBD COP-7 regarding disclosure of origin of biodiversity and traditional knowledge in 
patent applications. However, work under the new mandate needs to be further defi ned 
and the long-term strategy to protect genetic resources and traditional knowledge has not 
been completely established98. The seventh session of the IGC considered a set of draft 
provisions on objectives and principles for the protection of traditional knowledge against 
misappropriation and misuse. Further comments on those draft objectives and principles 
have been invited (until 25 February 2005). Other key issues at this meeting were the rela-
tionship between traditional knowledge and the patent system, and the appropriate legal 
form of protection for such knowledge99. There was no consensus on the future work of 
the IGC in the area of genetic resources so no decision was taken at the November meet-
ing on this issue, although it will be included in the agenda of the next IGC meeting.
4.2.1 Key positions at the IGC 
One of the main outcomes of recent IGC meetings was to accelerate its work on the 
protection of traditional knowledge. Brasil defends that developing countries should not 
have to take on new obligations in respect of conventional types of IPRs to protect tradi-
tional knowledge100. They argue that any proposed combined approach to the protection 
of that knowledge  would necessarily have to include the use of defensive protection 
measures, such as disclosure of origin and prior informed consent requirements in patent 
laws , as sui generis regimes for TK are  not a replacement or substitute for measures of 
a defensive nature, such as the use of disclosure of origin, prior informed consent and 
benefi t sharing requirements in patent laws 101. Brasil and the African Group agree that 
96 See BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest Vol. 8 No.11, of 24 March 2004.
97 See BRIDGES Trade Biores, Vol.4 No.18, of 8 October 2004.
98 Analysis of selected documents for the Seventh Session of the IGC, CIEL Brief, October 2004.
99 See BRIDGES Trade BioRes, Vol. 3 No.21, of 19 November 2004. The report of the meeting is not 
available yet.
100 Meeting report, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/6/14, of 14 April 2004, para.69.
101 Id.
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the relationship between the CBD and WIPO processes on access to genetic resources, 
benefi t-sharing, the protection of traditional knowledge and IPRs  should not go beyond 
a mutual exchange of information . 
India considers that to realise the objectives of traditional knowledge protection the IGC 
 would need to utilise fully the options available under the IP system 102. India argues that 
the IGC also needs to address the issue of misappropriation, not only to prevent future 
misappropriation but also to fi nd ways and means to provide solutions for past wrongs103. 
They argue the need for an agreed international framework for fast invalidation proce-
dures of  large-scale misappropriation ,  a problem that India has closely experienced due 
to numerous patents on their plants and crops. India also supports internationally binding 
sui generis legal instruments on traditional knowledge.
The EU has expressed its support for work towards the development of international sui 
generis models for the legal protection of traditional knowledge104, while the US supports 
the use of traditional IPR laws to protect inventions related to traditional knowledge,  but 
remained cautious  at the IGC meeting in March 2004 on the possibility of establishing 
new IPR laws as they  may confl ict  with the principles of traditional IPR laws105. This 
position points towards concerns from the US that exploring new ways of protecting tradi-
tional knowledge by using IPRs could affect current patent rules. The US did not support 
 the recognition of specifi c, intangible property rights in traditional knowledge that are 
outside of the scope of traditional IPR laws 106. They added that any new form of intangible 
property rights applying to traditional knowledge  had the potential to take vast amounts 
of material out of the public domain potentially for indefi nite periods . Furthermore, the 
US supports to focus and accelerate the work of the IGC on the protection of traditional 
knowledge as they maintain that WIPO is the appropriate forum for this work.
The IGC will compile legislative and policy options for the protection of traditional 
knowledge providing the basis for national or international measures, without excluding 
a possible international instrument for the protection of traditional knowledge and folk-
lore. The timeframe for these activities is the extended mandate of the IGC, i.e. until the 
end of 2005107.
At the heart of WIPO debates on biodiversity, traditional knowledge and IPRs lies a 
marked difference in views as to the role that such agency should place in the protection 
of traditional knowledge and the regulation of access to genetic resources, which WIPO 
body should take the lead on its work, and the co-ordination between WIPO and the CBD 
102 Id. at para.81.
103 Id.
104 Id, at para.75.
105 Id, at para.76.
106 Id.
107 See ICTSD, Trade BioRes, Vol. 4, no. 6, 2 April 2004.
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system. Concerns have also been expressed regarding the  pro-IPRs inherent bias  of 
WIPO, due to its mandate and objectives.
4.3  WTO and CBD 
In November 2001, the WTO held its Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, 
where ministers agreed to launch international trade negotiations under the so-called 
 Doha Development Agenda . The Doha Ministerial Declaration provided the mandate 
for global trade debates on a range of issues, including on the need to108: (i) continue the 
review of Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement; (ii) examine the relationship between 
the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD; and (iii) consider the protection of traditional knowl-
edge and folklore. The Ministerial Conference held in Cancún, Mexico, in September 
2003, failed to move these negotiations forward. A revised  negotiating package  was 
agreed in July 2004, moving the fi nal deadline for concluding the Doha negotiations from 
1 January 2005 to the end of that year, as the next WTO Ministerial Conference will take 
place in Hong Kong in December 2005.
The TRIPS Agreement does not include any provision related to the CBD requirements 
on access to genetic resources and benefi t-sharing or protection of traditional knowledge, 
but the Doha Declaration has reinforced the TRIPS review with its mandate to consider 
the protection of traditional knowledge, and the relationship between the TRIPS Agree-
ment and the CBD.
A number of CBD COP Decisions have also considered the need to address linkages 
between WTO trade issues and the CBD. As early as CBD COP-3, the CBD Secretariat 
was requested to co-operate closely with the WTO through the Committee on Trade and 
Environment to explore the extent to which there may be linkages between Article 15 (on 
access to genetic resources) and relevant articles of TRIPS109. The relationship between 
IPRs and the relevant provisions of TRIPS and the CBD was reaffi rmed in more detail in 
CBD COP-5 in 2000, which invited the WTO to acknowledge the relevant provisions of 
the CBD, take into account the fact that certain TRIPS and CBD provisions are interrelated, 
and further explore their linkages. The importance of sui generis systems for the protection 
of traditional knowledge of indigenous and local communities and the equitable sharing 
of benefi ts were also reaffi rmed at that meeting110. Later on, in 2002, COP-6 would further 
develop these concepts by adopting the Bonn Guidelines and acknowledging the inter-
relationship between the CBD and other relevant international regimes, such as WIPO and 
the FAO International Treaty for Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture111.
108 WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration, paragraph 19.
109 CBD COP Decision III/15, para.8.
110 CBD COP Decision V/26, para.B.1–4.
111 CBD COP Decision VI/24, para D.10.
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The TRIPS Council has met in several occasions since the Doha ministerial to discuss the 
relationship between TRIPS and the CBD, and the protection of traditional knowledge. 
In the context of these meetings, the WTO Secretariat published a note in August 2002 
on the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore summarising the issues raised and 
the positions observed112. This paper covered the protection of traditional knowledge, the 
granting of patents over that knowledge, prior informed consent, and benefi t-sharing. In 
addition, the CBD Secretariat submitted to the TRIPS Council updated information on 
CBD activities, the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, and the 
protection of traditional knowledge113. More recently, the CBD Secretariat has repeatedly 
applied to the TRIPS Council for observer status but to date this request has not been 
granted. 
A number of developing and developed countries have made submissions and proposals 
to the TRIPS Council on traditional knowledge, and on the relationship between the CBD 
and TRIPS, some of which are summarised below:
4.3.1 Main positions on the protection of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge:
• The African Group114 has proposed to classify traditional knowledge as a category of 
IPR. In addition, they have further proposed that the WTO should adopt a Decision on 
Traditional Knowledge establishing a WTO Committee on Traditional Knowledge and 
Genetic Resources to oversee the protection of traditional knowledge and enforcement 
of rights of WTO Members. Underpinning this proposal, which includes a draft deci-
sion annexed, was the Group s emphasis that the protection of genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge will not be effective until international mechanisms are imple-
mented within the TRIPS framework. They argue that the TRIPS Agreement has not 
provided adequate means to prevent patents in developed countries that involve misap-
propriation of genetic resources and traditional knowledge from developing countries, 
and that a solution needs to be found through improving the TRIPS Agreement. Cam-
paigning organisations115 have expressed support for the African Group proposal call-
ing for recognition by the WTO of traditional knowledge and rights of local communi-
ties. They argue that it  does not amount to giving more power to WTO and expanding 
the TRIPS agenda  but rather it is  the most effective means to limit the scope of patents 
and the scope of WTO jurisdiction over knowledge and biodiversity 116.
112 The protection of traditional knowledge and folklore — Summary of issues raised and points made, 
WTO Secretariat, IP/C/W/370, of 8 August 2002.
113 IP/C/W/347/Add.1 or WT/CTE/W/210, of 10 June 2002.
114 Taking forward the review of Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, Joint communication from 
the African Group, IP/C/W/404, of 26 June 2003.
115 GRAIN, Campaign to Demand Adoption of African Group s Proposal on Traditional Knowledge at 
the WTO Cancun Ministerial, 20 June 2003. See http://www.grain.org
116 Id.
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•  Switzerland117 welcomed the mandate given to the TRIPS Council by paragraph 19 
of the Doha Declaration to examine the issue of traditional knowledge. However, they 
think that WIPO s Intergovernmental Committee (see above)  is the primary interna-
tional forum to deal with the intellectual property-related issues of the protection of 
traditional knowledge .  Switzerland considers that it is necessary to start by establish-
ing a working defi nition of the concept of  traditional knowledge  and by determining 
the objectives of its protection. 
•  The European Union118 has indicated that the TRIPS Council  is not the right place 
to negotiate a protection regime for a complex new subject matter like traditional 
knowledge . Their position is that the WTO should build on the work undertaken by 
WIPO s Intergovernmental Committee and, depending on the outcome of that proc-
ess, an assessment should take place to decide whether the issue needs to be taken up 
by the TRIPS Council. 
• Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, India, Peru, Thailand and Ven-
ezuela119: Their joint submission argues for the insertion of a provision in the TRIPS 
Agreement mandating patent applicants for inventions that use genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge to disclose the source of origin of genetic resources and tradi-
tional knowledge, as well as to provide evidence they the necessary prior informed 
consent has been obtained, and of compliance with national rules on benefi t-sharing. 
These countries consider that such provisions are critical to ensure that the TRIPS 
Agreement and the CBD are implemented in a mutually supportive manner.
An interesting initiative has been the formation in February 2002 of the  Group of Like-
minded Megadiverse Countries , which include Bolivia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, South Africa 
and Venezuela. Their objective is spelt out in the Cancún Declaration, which states that 
these megadiverse countries representing  nearly 70 per cent of the planet s biological 
diversity  are concerned about  the limitations of various international instruments to pro-
tect effectively the legitimate interests of the countries of origin of biodiversity 120. These 
group of biodiversity-rich and infl uential developing countries were keen to set up a mech-
anism for consultation and co-operation to promote their common interests and priorities 
regarding biodiversity protection and sustainable use. The Megadiverse Group was instru-
mental in achieving the WSSD mandate for an international regime on benefi t-sharing and, 
117 Article 27.3(b), the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, and the protection of 
traditional knowledge, Communication from Switzerland, IP/C/W/400, of 28 May 2003.
118 Review of Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, and the relationship between the TRIPS Agree-
ment and the CBD, and the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore, A communication from 
the European Communities and their Member States, IP/C/W/383, of 17 October 2002 (and WT/
CTE/W/223, of 14 February 2003).
119 The relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD and the protection of traditional 
knowledge, IP/C/W/403, of 24 June 2003.
120 Cancún Declaration of the Like-minded Megadiverse Countries, 18 February 2002, paragraph 1(h). 
See at http://www.megadiverse.org/armado_ingles/PDF/three/three1.pdf
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in November 2002121, the Group stressed their commitment to promote those international 
negotiations on access and benefi t-sharing, scheduled to begin in February 2005.
As developing countries hope that the current round of international trade negotiations in 
the WTO will include biodiversity-related issues of access to genetic resources, benefi t 
sharing and the protection of traditional knowledge, the positions are getting more and 
more polarised and also changing, with a major shift in the African Group from their 
long-held position that these issues should be discussed in the CBD framework and not in 
the WTO, to argue for the inclusion of traditional knowledge as part of the TRIPS Agree-
ment, while they continue to support that TRIPS should ban all patenting of life forms.
4.3.2 Positions on the relationship between TRIPS and the CBD:
The African Group and other developing countries maintain their opposition to the patent-
ing of life forms. African countries propose122 that Article 27(3)(b) of the TRIPS Agreement 
be revised to prohibit patents on plans, animals, micro-organisms, essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants or animals, and non-biological and microbiologi-
cal processes for the production of plants or animals. The minimum change they require 
would be the clarifi cation that paragraph (3)(b)  does not in any manner restrict the rights 
of Members to resort to the exception in paragraph 27(2) , which is the exception on 
grounds of  ordre public or morality . In the fi eld of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge, the African Group proposes that the TRIPS Agreement be modifi ed to require 
patent applicants  to disclose the country and area of origin of any biological resources 
and traditional knowledge used or involved in the invention, and to provide confi rmation 
of compliance with all access regulations in the country of origin 123.
Industrialised countries have positioned themselves at different levels of opposition to the 
recommendations of developing countries outlined above, especially on the relationship 
between the CBD and the TRIPS Agreement. The US124 argues that  the purposes of the 
CBD and TRIPS Agreement are widely disparate  and that most of their provisions  are 
unrelated in any way  so they consider that there is no need to amend the provisions  of 
either agreement to accommodate the implementation of the other . The US, not Party 
to the CBD, is also opposed to requiring that patent applicants identify the source of any 
genetic material or traditional knowledge used in developing their inventions, which they 
describe as  a legal and administrative nightmare 125. They consider that to ensure a shar-
121 Cusco Declaration on Access to Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual 
Property Rights of Like-minded Megadiverse Countries, 29 November 2002. See at http://www.
megadiverse.org 
122 Taking forward the review of Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, Joint Communication from 
the African Group to the TRIPS Council, IP/C/W/404, of 26 June 2003.
123 Id, at p.6.
124 Review of the provisions of Article 27.3(b) — Further views of the United States, Communication 
from the United States, IP/C/W/209, of 3 October 2000.
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ing of the benefi ts derived from accessing genetic resources, obligations must arise  at 
the beginning of the process, not at the point of commercialisation 126. More recently, the 
US has argued that the provisions of Articles 8(j), 15, 16 and 19 of the CBD are mutually 
supportive of the TRIPS Agreement and therefore  not confl icting 127. 
Switzerland also supports the view that the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD  can and 
should be implemented without confl ict  and so there is no need to modify either of these 
agreements128. But Switzerland has gone further and put forward several proposals to the 
WTO s Committee on Trade and Environment that would lead to the adoption by WTO 
members of an interpretative decision to clarify the TRIPS-CBD relationship. In addi-
tion, Switzerland s position disagrees with the US position on the use of the IPR system 
to ensure compliance with regulations on access to genetic resources and benefi t-sharing. 
Switzerland proposes to enable national patent legislation to require the declaration of the 
source of genetic resources and traditional knowledge in patent applications. To achieve 
this, Switzerland s proposal includes amending the Regulations under the Patent Coop-
eration Treaty129.
The EU submitted its position130 on the relationship between TRIPS and the CBD together 
with its views on the review of Article 27(3)(b) of the TRIPS Agreement. The EU posi-
tion is that there is no need to amend Article 27(3)(b) and that there is no legal confl ict 
between the CBD and the TRIPS Agreement, which should be read in a mutually sup-
portive way. The EU agrees to discuss the introduction of a system that would allow to 
keep track of patent applications related to genetic resources, but they consider that the 
information to be provided by patent applicants should be limited to the geographic ori-
gin of the genetic resources or traditional knowledge used in the invention, without being 
made into  an additional formal or substantial patentability criterion 131. The EU and other 
industrialised countries, such as Switzerland, Canada and the US, argue that WIPO, rather 
than the TRIPS Council, is the appropriate forum to deal with issues related to IPRs and 
access to genetic resources, benefi t sharing and traditional knowledge.
In 2002, a group of developing countries submitted their joint opinion on the CBD-TRIPS 
relationship and the protection of traditional knowledge to the TRIPS Council. Their main 
arguments were as follows132:
125 Id, at p.5.
126 Id, at p.6.
127 Communication from the United States to the TRIPS Council, IP/C/W/257, of 13 June 2001.
128  Article 27.3(b), the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, and the protection of 
traditional knowledge , Communication from Switzerland, IP/C/W/400, of 28 May 2003.
129 Id, at pp.6-7.
130 See n.118.
131 Id.
132  The relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD and the protection of traditional 
knowledge , Communication from Brazil on behalf of Brazil, China, Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
 Ecuador, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe. IP/C/W/356, of 24 June 
2002.
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• The TRIPS Agreement and the CBD should be mutually supportive and promote the 
sustainable use of resources so modifi cations to the TRIPS Agreement are necessary 
to ensure that it will not run counter to the objectives of the CBD;
• While the CBD recognizes countries  sovereign rights over their biological resources, 
the TRIPS Agreement allows WTO Members to provide patents over biological 
resources  — the TRIPS Agreement does not prevent  bio-piracy  activities where pat-
ent rights can be claimed in one country over genetic resources that are under the 
sovereignty of another country; 
• The TRIPS Agreement contains no provisions ensuring the prior informed consent 
of the owners of the biological resources used in the invention. It has no provisions 
allowing a Member s claim to enforce its national regimes for fair and equitable shar-
ing of benefi ts from the patenting of its own genetic resources in another country. The 
TRIPS Agreement should be amended to require that an applicant for a patent relating 
to biological materials or to traditional knowledge provides:
(i) disclosure of the source and country of origin of the biological resource and of the 
traditional knowledge used in the invention;
(ii) evidence of prior informed consent through approval of authorities under the 
 relevant national regimes; and
(iii) evidence of fair and equitable benefi t sharing under the national regime of the coun-
try of origin.
These countries argued that failure to provide a solution to ensure a mutually supportive 
relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD may be detrimental to the objec-
tives of both instruments. They claim that to avoid confl icts in the implementation of 
TRIPS, it is necessary to amend it to accommodate some essential elements of the CBD 
— in the framework of ongoing negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda. 
Using the same arguments, a similar group of countries made a further submission133 
to the TRIPS Council stressing the need to amend the TRIPS Agreement by inserting 
a provision that mandates patent applicants for inventions that use biodiversity and/or 
traditional knowledge, to disclose the source of origin of those resources and knowledge, 
and provide evidence that they have obtained the PIC and complied with national laws 
on benefi t sharing. 
More recently, in March 2004, the same group of countries has submitted a  checklist 
of issues  to the TRIPS Council134. The objective of the checklist is to  facilitate more 
133 See n. 119.
134 The relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, sub-
mission from Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, India, Peru, Thailand and Venezuela (Bolivia subsequently 
adhered to it). IP/C/W/420, of 2 March 2004.
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focused, structured and result-oriented discussions, as these countries report that more 
than 25 communications and papers on the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement 
and the CBD have been submitted to the TRIPS Council. The main issue highlighted by 
this group of developing countries is the challenge to determine the measures that need 
to be taken within the framework of the TRIPS Agreement to prevent misappropriation 
of resources and knowledge, and to support the objectives and implementation of the 
CBD. At its latest meeting, in September 2004, the TRIPS Council considered a proposal 
by a group of countries135 to advance discussions on the relationship between the TRIPS 
Agreement, biodiversity issues and traditional knowledge, but WTO members remained 
locked in their positions, so no substantive progress was made136.
Relevant recommendations to developing countries from the UK s independent Commis-
sion on Intellectual Property Rights, in relation to patents and biodiversity, the review of 
the TRIPS Agreement, and the protection of traditional knowledge, are listed below137:
• The review of the relevant provisions in TRIPS which is currently taking place in the 
TRIPS Council should preserve the right of countries not to grant patents for plants 
and animals, including genes and genetically modifi ed plants and animals. 
• All countries should provide in their legislation for the obligatory disclosure of infor-
mation in the patent application of the geographical source of genetic resources from 
which the invention is derived. This requirement should be subject to reasonable 
exceptions as, for example, where it is genuinely impossible to identify the geographi-
cal source of material. Sanctions should be applied only where it can be shown that 
the patentee has failed to disclose the known source or where he has sought to deliber-
ately mislead about the source. The TRIPS Council should consider this in the light of 
the review of this issue recommended in the WTO Ministerial Declaration at Doha.
• Consideration should also be given to establishing a system whereby patent offi ces 
examining patent applications which identify the geographical source of genetic 
resources or traditional knowledge pass on that information either to the country con-
cerned, or to WIPO. WIPO may act as a depository for patent related information of 
this nature. Through these measures it will be possible to monitor more closely the use 
and misuse of genetic resources.
• Developing countries need to identify a strategy for dealing with the risk that further 
harmonisation of patent laws internationally will lead to standards that do not take 
account of their interests. Such a strategy might seek a global standard refl ecting the 
135  Elements of the Obligation to Disclose the Source and Country of Origin of the Biological 
 Resources and/or Traditional Knowledge Used in an Invention , submission from Brazil, Cuba, 
 Ecuador, India, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, and Venezuela, and Bolivia, to the TRIPS Council (revised 
document IP/C/W/429/Rev.1, of 27 September 2004).
136 See BRIDGES Trade BioRes, Vol. 4 No. 17, of 23 September 2004
137 See n. 17.
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recommendations of this report. It could seek continued fl exibility in the standards. 
Or it could be done by rejection of the process if it appears that the outcome will not 
be in the interests of developing countries.
The complex web of international institutions, legal frameworks, mandates and positions 
surrounding two biodiversity  elements  such as genetic resources and traditional knowl-
edge, of increasing economic and research value, creates a diffi cult scenario for mak-
ing progress in the protection of biological diversity and associated traditional knowl-
edge. Increased coherence and co-ordination, at the national and international levels, are 
needed as many of these global fora are often played against each other or used to trade-
off  different national interests and priorities.
4.3.3 NGO positions
One of the most active NGOs on issues of genetic resources, traditional knowledge, food 
safety and IPRs is GRAIN (Genetic Resources Action International). GRAIN supports 
the proposals from developing countries to review Article 27(3)(b) of the TRIPS Agree-
ment, such as the ban on life patents, and a strong mechanism for disclosing that origin 
of resources, including detailed information on the provider of the materials or knowl-
edge used, and proof of prior informed consent and benefi t-sharing138. However, GRAIN 
argues that  even if the proposals from developing countries were accepted in full, they 
would not solve the problem of bio-piracy , as nothing would guarantee that the indig-
enous or local communities who own the resources and knowledge receive a fair deal in 
return if the only proof required is that of government agencies. 
GRAIN is also concerned that an agreement on disclosure of origin could be regarded as 
a  capitulation  on the request for a ban on life patents, as making disclosure of origin a 
condition for patenting plants or animals contradicts the fundamental principle of  no pat-
ents on life  for which many NGOs campaign139. GRAIN questions the change of position 
of the African Group on the protection of traditional knowledge, and disagrees with the 
view that the WTO is the place  to look for protection  of genetic resources or traditional 
knowledge given that the WTO mandate is narrowly concerned with the promotion of 
international free trade. 
In addition, a coalition of NGOs140 has put forward a set of proposals ( TRIPS on Trial )  for 
the review of TRIPS Article 27(3)(b), calling on WTO members to agree to the immediate 
review of this provision, which should be conducted outside the wider WTO  negotiations. 
These NGOs argue that WTO members should: 
138 GRAIN Briefi ng, The TRIPS review at a turning point? July 2003. See at http://www.grain.org
139 Id.
140 ActionAid, Berne Declaration, Switzerland, Centro Debate de Accion y Ambiental, Colombia, Insti-
tute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP), Latin American Institute for Legal Service Alternative, 
MISEREOR, Oxfam International, and Third World Network.
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• act on the proposal of the African Group and ban patents on life (plants, animals, 
micro-organisms and all other living organisms and their parts, as well as the natural 
processes that produce plants, animals and other living organisms).
• respect the right of developing countries to determine the need for appropriate sui 
generis laws to protect communities  and farmers  rights, and promote agricultural 
diversity;
• ensure that the provisions of Article 27(3)(b) of the TRIPS Agreement are consistent 
with the CBD provisions on national sovereignty, prior informed consent and benefi t-
sharing regarding access to genetic resources and traditional knowledge; and
• restrict or ban IPRs on plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, in the interest 
of long-term food security and to prevent bio-piracy.
This group of NGOs considers that the objectives of technological innovation and tech-
nology transfer should place IPRs in the context of the public interest of social and eco-
nomic welfare. They remind us that TRIPS also acknowledges the right of WTO mem-
bers to adopt measures for protecting overarching public policy objectives, such as public 
health and nutrition, and socio-economic and technological development, and to prevent 
abuse of IPRs and anti-competitive practices, although these fundamental objectives and 
principles have been ignored by certain developed countries in their interpretation and 
implementation of TRIPS, which are perpetuating the crisis of legitimacy that TRIPS is 
already facing. NGOs have made specifi c demands related to the patenting of life and 
access to medicines, and they recognise that there is common ground among different 
campaigns relating to the patenting of life, bio-piracy, food security, and public health and 
access to affordable medicines, as they share the view that TRIPS represents a signifi cant 
shift in the balance in IPR protection which is too heavily in favour of private right-hold-
ers and against the public interest141.
Another active NGO in the area of IPRs, biodiversity and biotechnology is the ETC 
Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration. The ETC Group has monitored for 
two decades the role of the private sector on policy developments and has alerted about 
the power and infl uence of multi-national corporations on the regulation of biotechnology 
and the use of IPRs142. They have reported that half of the world s 100 largest economic 
entities are transnational corporations, which have  unprecedented power to shape social, 
economic and trade policies . They argue that corporate hegemony is usurping the role 
and responsibilities of national governments, threatening democracy and human rights. 
They consider as a priority the creation of capacity to track, evaluate and accept or reject 
new technologies and their products, for which they propose an International Convention 
on the Evaluation of New Technologies143.
141 Id.
142 ETC Group Communiqué, Oligopoly, Inc. — Concentration in Corporate Power, November/
December 2003. See at http:///www.etcgroup.org
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Regarding the private sector, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD),  a coalition of 165 international companies united by a shared commitment 
to sustainable development via the three pillars of economic growth, ecological balance 
and social progress 144, conducted a stakeholder dialogue in 2001–2002 involving com-
panies, NGOs, legal and political experts, to discuss IPRs and biotechnology issues. The 
aim was to make companies  responsive to criticism  raised by NGOs, and the process 
was designed to  expose the business community to the views and concerns of its critics  
and to explore possible solutions145. The summary conclusions of this exercise, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, do not go beyond stating that  participants disagreed over the morality of 
patents on genes , but they also include confi rmation that  companies must comply with 
the CBD and refrain from unauthorised appropriation of traditional knowledge through 
breach of confi dentiality or through fi ling patents for knowledge that exists as prior art 146. 
There was also broad agreement that  imposing a global order of IPRs through TRIPS 
tends to favour developed more than developing countries, and that the acceptance of 
TRIPS will be seriously jeopardized if developed countries continue to fail to live up to 
their promises to grant market access 147. While it is positive that business coalitions such 
as the WBCSD try to engage with civil society and campaigning organisations on these 
issues, it seems that their efforts are unconnected to the  closed room  infl uence that some 
large businesses achieve over major public policies and national negotiating positions at 
international fora.
The impact of civil society on the process of setting IPR standards should be highlighted. 
After governments and business, NGOs are considered to have become a  third force in 
the global politics of IPRs 148, operating as  an analytical resource  as well as partners of 
developing countries. However, these coalitions are mostly issue-specifi c and considered 
to be diffi cult to put together and manage. A crucial aspect is that they do not threaten the 
dominance of the US and the EU in global IPR policy, especially when they agree on the 
direction of global IPR regulation149.
144 See http://www.wbcsd.ch
145 WBCSD, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology and Health Care — Results of a stakeholder 
dialogue, July 2003.
146 Id.
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4.4   Plant varieties for food and agriculture: UPOV, TRIPS and the 
FAO Treaty
Regarding the protection of plant varieties and plant genetic resources for food and agri-
culture, the applicable international regimes that regulate access to those resources, ben-
efi t-sharing and IPRs are those of TRIPS, UPOV and the new FAO International Treaty 
of 2001, which entered into force on 29 June 2004.
TRIPS Article 27(3)(b) allows exceptions to patents and, in the case of plants, they can be 
exempted from patentability if they are subject to a sui generis regime. The International 
Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), an intergovernmental organ-
ization with headquarters in Geneva (Switzerland), was established by the International 
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants150, whose objective is the protec-
tion of new varieties of plants through plant breeders  rights (PBRs). The UPOV treaties 
are considered a sui generis system of protection designed to address the needs and rights 
of plant breeders. However, the TRIPS Agreement does not specifi cally mention any IPR 
agreement regarding plant varieties such as UPOV 1978 and 1991. This circumstance dif-
fers from other IPRs such as patents or copyrights, where the TRIPS Agreement requires 
compliance with previously established standards of IP protection in specifi c treaties or 
conventions.
The fi rst UPOV Act was drafted in 1961 by industrialised countries which wished to 
protect their plant breeders in domestic and international markets. The UPOV convention 
was later reviewed by the 1972, 1978 and 1991 Acts151. UPOV 1991 entered into force in 
April 1998, and since then UPOV 1978 has been closed to new accessions. UPOV 1991 
is considered more favourable to plant breeders and more restrictive for farmers. The 
UPOV Convention establishes minimum standards such as requiring the breeder s prior 
authorisation for at least three activities regarding protected varieties: (i) production for 
commercial purposes; (ii) offering for sale: and (iii) the marketing of the reproductive 
propagating material of the variety. 
Under UPOV 1991, a plant variety must be novel, distinct, stable, and uniform (or homo-
geneous, in UPOV 1978). The right of breeders both to use protected varieties as an initial 
source of variation for the creation of new varieties, and to market these varieties without 
authorisation from the original breeder (the  breeders  exemption) is upheld in both ver-
sions. A key difference in UPOV 1991 is that if a new variety is deemed to be essentially 
derived from a protected variety, the owner of the protected variety enjoys the same rights 
over the essentially derived variety as if the two varieties were identical152. UPOV 1991 
also differs from UPOV 1978 in a number of other important areas:
150 54 countries are currently members of UPOV. See http://www.upov.int
151 The 1991 version entered into force on 24 April 1998. That day the 1978 treaty was closed to new 
accessions, except for a few countries which had already started that process. 
152 See n.14.
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• Coverage: UPOV Parties must bring all plant species within the scope of their PBR 
legislation within 10 years of acceding to the 1991 Act;
• Term of protection: UPOV 1991 requires a minimum of 20 years  protection (25 years 
for trees and vines), while under the 1978 Act the requirement was 15 and 18 years 
respectively. 
• Scope of plant variety rights: unlike the  cascade  of rights available under the 1991 
Act, rights under the 1978 Act extended only as far as the propagating material of a 
plant breeder s protected variety.
• Right to double protection: UPOV 1991 Act allows a plant variety to be protected both 
by a PBR and by a patent. UPOV 1978 forbade this.
Concerns have been raised that the UPOV system was designed to accommodate the 
large-scale commercial agricultural systems in Europe and therefore is unsuitable for most 
developing countries, due to the implications for small farmers and rural communities. 
UPOV has also been criticised for promoting the interests of commercial plant breeders 
in the North rather than the farming communities153. The uniformity requirement is said to 
contribute to genetic erosion and the cost of maintaining UPOV certifi cation is considered 
beyond the means of most farmers. In addition, the type of protection granted by UPOV s 
PBRs is an exclusive monopoly right, with certain exemptions for other breeders. This 
contrasts sharply with the broader goals of collective remuneration and benefi t-sharing 
expressed in the CBD and the FAO Global Plan of Action for the Conservation and Sus-
tainable Utilization of Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture154. 
The FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture rec-
ognises the contribution that local and indigenous communities and farmers from all over 
the world have made towards the conservation and development of plant genetic resources 
for food and agriculture155. This treaty provides some general guidance on the scope of the 
rights which must be protected, but it leaves total discretion to Parties as to the measures 
to be adopted in order to protect and promote farmers  rights, which are156:
• the protection of traditional knowledge relevant for plant genetic resources for food 
and agriculture;
• the right to equitably participate in sharing benefi ts arising from the utilization of 
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture; and
• the right to participate in making decisions, at the national level, on matters related to 
the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agricul-
ture.
153 South Centre, workshop report, The Patenting of Plants: The Controversial TRIPS Article 27.3 (b), 
1998, see http://www.southcentre.org
154 Id.
155 2001 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Article 9(1).
156 Id, at Article 9(2).
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However, the International Treaty does not address the rights of farmers over their own 
varieties, and the recognition of farmers  contribution to the conservation and improve-
ment of plant varieties does not extend to property rights. In this sense, the only rights that 
are included are those to  to save, use, exchange and sell farm-saved seed/propagating 
material, subject to national law and as appropriate 157(emphasis added).
The new FAO Treaty represents a substantial step forward for the regulation of plant 
genetic resources, moving from a non-binding regime to a mandatory system. However, 
and despite the lengthy international negotiations, not all the crucial issues could be ade-
quately solved in the Treaty text, and so the success of this regime will largely lie in post-
agreement developments and further negotiations at the international and national level.
4.4.1 The African Model Law 
Africa is the source of many crop varieties. About 70 percent of tropical fodder grasses 
and 25 percent of legumes cultivated worldwide originate from Africa158. The Organisa-
tion for African Unity, now the African Union, led a process to assist African countries in 
protecting their biodiversity and agricultural systems while complying with their CBD- 
and TRIPS-related obligations. This initiative resulted in the development of the  Model 
Legislation on the Protection of the Rights of Local Communities, Farmers and Breeders, 
and for the Regulation of Access to Biological Resources , which was endorsed by the 
OAU Heads of State in 2000, recommending that it become the basis of all national laws 
on these issues across Africa.
The main aim of the OAU s Model Law was to  ensure the conservation, evaluation 
and sustainable use of biological resources, including agricultural genetic resources, and 
knowledge and technologies, in order to maintain and improve their diversity as a means 
of sustaining all life support systems .  Other objectives of the Model Law were to protect 
and support the rights of local communities over their biological resources, knowledge 
and technologies; and to promote the supply of good quality seed/planting material to 
farmers; as well as ensuring that biological resources are utilised in an effective and equi-
table manner to strengthen food security159.
In May 2001, the OAU met with WIPO and UPOV to seek comments on the Model Law, 
which were critical160: WIPO argued that the prohibition of patents on life goes against 
TRIPS Article 27(3)(b), as it requires patents on micro-organisms, and also rejected 
the inalienability of community rights embedded in the Law. UPOV offi cials reworked 
157 Id, at Article 9(3).
158 Singh H, Emerging Plant Variety Legislations and Their Implications for Developing Countries: 
Experiences from India and Africa, Paper presented at the Conference TRIPS — Next Agenda for 
Developing Countries, Shyamprasad Institute for Social Service, Hyderabad, 11–12 October 2002
159 OAU Model Law, Part I — Objectives.
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more than 30 provisions of the Model Law to make them conform to the UPOV conven-
tion161. This points towards the desire to limit the sui generis option of Article 27(3)(b) 
to the UPOV Convention, a treaty promoted by industrialised countries to achieve global 
 harmonisation of IPR laws worldwide based on Western standards as the international 
level of IPR protection. 
4.5   Current trends in IPR policy: the  misuse  of bilateral free trade 
agreements
The growing number of developing countries joining UPOV 1991 is partly due to the also 
fast increasing number of bilateral and regional trade agreements being negotiated by the 
US, EU, and other industrialised nations, with developing countries. Those bilateral trade 
treaties often require developing countries to either join UPOV or  upgrade  from UPOV 
1978 to UPOV 1991 even if they are already Parties to the TRIPS Agreement, as in most 
cases the IPR provisions of these free trade agreements include stricter IPR standards than 
the  minimum  levels set by the TRIPS Agreement, which also allows Parties some fl ex-
ibility, as in the case of plant varieties. This is why these treaties are called  TRIPS-plus  
(or  TRIPS + ) agreements. Some examples of such bilateral treaties include the 1998 
US-Nicaragua agreement; the 2000 US-Jordan treaty and the 2003 Free Trade Agreement 
between the US and Chile162. 
Equally important is the implications of rising national IPR standards as a result of a 
particular bilateral trade agreement, as according to WTO rules such IPR protection must 
be extended to all other WTO members. Bilateral trade agreements are being used (some 
would say  misused ) to increase IPR standards beyond TRIPS requirements163. This 
amounts to an active policy by the most powerful global economies to undermine the 
multilateral trade system while international negotiations under the WTO Doha agenda 
are not progressing as planned.
But the US is not the only driver in this change of global trade tactics, GRAIN has reported 
that the EU has  forced  TRIPS-plus commitments, including IPRs on life forms, in nearly 
90 developing countries164. GRAIN has defi ned TRIPS-plus agreements as those going 
beyond the TRIPS Agreement and, more specifi cally, as any treaty that contains an obli-
gation to165: (i) implement or join the UPOV conventions; (ii) grant patents on plants or 
animals; (iii) join the Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of 
161 Id.
162 Vivas-Eugui D,  Regional and bilateral agreements and a TRIPS-plus world: the Free Trade Area of 
the Americas (FTAA) ,  Quaker United Nations Offi ce (QUNO), Ginebra, 2003.
163 Drahos P,  BITs and BIPs ,  Journal of World Intellectual Property Law, 2001. 
164 GRAIN, TRIPS-plus  must stop: The European Union caught in blatant contradictions, March 2003.
165 GRAIN, TRIPS-plus — How FTAs and other bilateral treaties impose IPRs on life in developing 
countries, February 2004. 
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Micro-organisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure; and (iv) conform with the  highest 
international standards  of IPR protection. GRAIN has called on the EU to  immediately 
cease and desist from imposing TRIPS-plus measures on developing countries .
In addition, the Group of the Greens in the European Parliament asked the European 
Commission about the reasons for upholding the fl exibilities of the TRIPS Agreement 
at the multilateral level while simultaneously making TRIPS-plus demands, such as the 
accession to UPOV 1991, on developing countries at the bilateral level166.
Connections can be drawn between TRIPS-plus agreements promoted by US and the EU, 
and multinational corporations benefi ting from IPRs over biotechnology. Considering 
that some 75 developing countries have made commitments to recognise industrial patens 
on plants and animals, including GMOs, as a result of bilateral agreements with the US 
and the EU167, the market gains for industry are clear, especially when those developing 
countries have the choice not to accept those high IPR standards under the TRIPS Agree-
ment. The use of bilateral trade negotiations to enhance global IPR standards in exchange 
for developing countries  market access for their products in the North has being actively 
promoted by the US and the EU in recent years. The  bargaining power  of developing 
countries in such small negotiating fora on a  one-to-one basis  is proving clearly dimin-
ished in comparison with the leverage that they can operate in multilateral trade talks by 
presenting joint positions and through the increased leverage they get from the G-77, 
regional groups and other alliances.
The growing number and importance of such bilateral trade agreements has resulted in a 
joint initiative by a group of NGOs which have recently set up a specifi c website critical 
of such agreements and providing news, articles and follow-up on this issue168.
166 The Greens in the European Parliament, press release: EU goes further than WTO on Intellectual 
Property Rules, 25 March 2003.
167 See n.165.
168 See http://www.bilaterals.org (´a collective effort to share information and stimulate cooperation 
against bilateral trade and investment agreements that are opening countries to the deepest forms of 
penetration by transnational corporations´).
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5.  A way forward?
Having gone through key discussions at the international level on intellectual property 
rights, biodiversity, traditional knowledge and food safety, it is clear that the international 
IPR regime is relevant and plays an important role in the conservation and protection of 
biological diversity, traditional knowledge systems and rural livelihoods at the global 
level, and especially in the developing world. However, views on that role, its adequacy, 
effectiveness, and need for change, vary widely among countries, regions, institutions, 
indigenous peoples, and civil society at large.
The TRIPS Agreement, with its 147 Parties, the CBD with 188, and WIPO with 180 
Member States, mean that countries need to make the IPR and biodiversity regimes work 
together, while making the necessary adjustments or amendments to make that happen. 
All the international IPR and biodiversity treaties need national legislation and other 
mechanisms to be implemented and achieve their objectives, both the ones found in the 
CBD, such as the fair and equitable sharing of benefi ts arising from the use of genetic 
resources; the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity; and the objectives 
of the TRIPS Agreement:  the promotion of technological innovation and the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of techno-
logical knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a 
balance of rights and obligations .  Parties disagree over the compatibility or otherwise of 
these regimes and some consider that the objectives or their operationalisation need revis-
ing to make them fully compatible. This is the current situation at the international level.
But very little in international law and politics is simple or straightforward. Issues, insti-
tutions and people are connected and inter-linked, governments are infl uenced by eco-
nomic considerations, industry needs, public opinion, investment fl ows and trade rela-
tions, among other factors. In addition, the international legal infrastructure is heavily 
complex. Overtime a considerable number of international treaties and conventions have 
been adopted, amended and further developed, while they interact with an increasing 
number of regional and bilateral agreements on issues that are inter-connected or just 
related. Discussions and decisions taken in one forum have implications in others, to a 
bigger or lesser degree, and countries need to share information and improve coordination 
to present coherent positions in all fora, which is not always the case, not even among the 
best resourced industrialised countries.
It is often useful to look back and consider how it all started to help guide us through the 
way forward. In the early 1990s, the CBD and the WTO were negotiated almost simulta-
neously but also in a disconnected way: trade experts, lawyers and economists were shap-
ing the future global trade rules, while those concerned with wildlife, the environment, 
and the preservation of the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples regarding nature, 
were negotiating a new international treaty aimed at biodiversity conservation, sustain-
able use, and fair sharing of benefi ts derived from genetic resources. However, the TRIPS 
and CBD regimes have a common feature: they establish a few specifi c and measurable 
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obligations but mostly leave fl exibility to countries as to how to achieve the set objectives 
they lay down. TRIPS has  minimum standards  and allows exceptions on the obligations 
it sets, while the CBD would need further discussions and incentives over the years to 
move closer to its objectives, without being able to report much success after its fi rst 10 
years as we continue facing the loss and decline of biological diversity. 
What has signifi cantly changed in the last 10 years is technological developments and 
industrial processes that can make further use of natural resources and turn them into 
commercial products and processes for which there is a growing market in industrialised 
countries. Those markets and bussinesses are increasingly attracting profi ts and further 
investment, while they need IPRs to ensure maximum returns and prevent others from 
freely using the results of their investment. Add to the equation the increased organisation 
and infl uence of groups of developing countries at the international level, and the result is 
a shift to one-to-one trade negotiations between the biggest economies in the world and 
individual developing countries, individually or grouped in sub-regions or regions. The 
result is a further loss of the fl exibilities allowed by global rules, as powerful industries 
in powerful countries are moving faster than the national implementation of TRIPS and 
CBD, while they try to infl uence the ongoing international negotiations in line with their 
needs and objectives.
This is where we currently are and, to look at the way forward we need to fi rstly consider 
the priorities and needs of all the relevant actors and elements to assess what the future 
will bring. Will it be the failure of the Doha mandate? Long and protracted negotiations 
on an international regime on access to genetic resources and benefi t-sharing? A continu-
ous stream of new bilateral free trade agreements with developing coutries incorporating 
stricter IPR obligations? UPOV achieving global membership? 
A more constructive approach in looking ahead is also possible, by pointing to some of 
the unresolved issues that need to be further addressed and explored169: (i) it is not certain 
that increased availability of IPR protection will automatically lead to greater levels of 
innovation in society; (ii) we still do not know how far biodiversity is affected by IPRs 
on seeds, plant varieties and agro-chemicals, but we cannot afford to wait for conclusive 
proof one way or the other before making decisions on the design of environmentally 
sound IPRs, including the application of the precautionary principle in the IPR context; 
and (iii) while patents are clearly unsuitable to protect the rights of traditional knowledge 
holders, the use of other IPRs may be appropriate in some circumstances.
NGOs and campaigners will also be crucial in shaping of the way forward170, with propos-
als for an alternative to UPOV having been suggested by the Indian NGO, Gene Cam-
paign, while groups such as Third World Network, GRAIN, and the Research Founda-
169 Dutfi eld G, Intellectual Property Rights, Trade and Biodiversity: Seeds and Plant Varieties, IUCN 
and Earthscan Publications Ltd., 2000.
170 See n. 46.
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tion for Science, Technology and Ecology have advocated community IPR regimes. In 
addition, there have been suggestions to recognise and make operational concepts such 
as traditional resource rights, which encompass intellectual and physical resource and 
cultural rights. 
Developing countries themselves are part of the system but also more numerous in the 
United Nations than industrialised countries. They are actively submitting proposals in 
international fora while planning and undertaking measures at the regional and national 
level. The way forward will be to a large extent dependent on their bargaining power, 
their priorities, and alliances. The future direction of these policy areas will be the result 
of the legal and institutional systems set in the past, the current global circumstances, and 
the interest of governments and politicians, determined to a large extent by the opinion 
of citizens and the private sector. The fi nal results are uncertain, but decisions taken in 
the fora analysed in this paper, CBD, WTO, WIPO and FAO, will determine the future 
of global biodiversity and the survival of traditional knowledge systems from indigenous 
peoples and local communities.
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